Selected Bibliography on Brentano

Franz Brentano’s Bibliographical Resources
From: http://www.ontology.co/brentanof.htm

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL RESOURCES

Paolo Gregoretti – Franz Brentano. Bibliografia completa (1862-1982) – Trieste, Università degli Studi, 1983. (I. Works by Franz Brentano 7; II. Translations 21; III. Studies on Brentano 25; Index of Authors 81-87).

Wilhelm Baumgartner and F. P. Burkard – Franz Brentano Bibliographie in: International bibliography of Austrian philosophy 1982/83 – Internationale Bibliographie zur osterreichischen Philosophie – Compiled with assistance of Thomas Binder, Jutta Valent, Helmut Werba – Amsterdam, Rodopi 1990.

Liliana Albertazzi – Immanent realism: an introduction to Brentano – Dordrecht, Springer 2006, pp. 341-354.

Selected Bibliography on Brentano’s Contributions to Logic and Ontology

1. “Die Philosophie Franz Brentanos.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 5 (1978).
   Special Issue. Contributions to the Brentano-Konferenz Graz, 4-8 September 1977 (Edited by Roderick Chisholm and Rudolf Haller).
   Edgar Morscher: Brentano and his place in Austrian philosophy 1; George Katkov: The world in which Brentano believed he lived 11; Stephan Körner: Über Brentanos Reismus und die extensionale Logik 29; Burnham Terrell: Quantification and Brentano’s logic 45; Klaus Hedwig: Der scholastische Kontext des Intentionalen bei Brentano 67; Dagfinn Follesdal : Brentano and Husserl on intentional objects and perception 83; Herbert Spiegelberg: On the significance of the correspondence between Franz Brentano and      Edmund Husserl 95; Izydora Dambska: François Brentano et la pensée philosophique en Pologne: Casimir Twardowski et son École 117; Peter Geach: Intentionality of thought versus intentionality of desire 131; Elizabeth Anscombe: Will and emotion 139; Heiner Rutte: Brentanos antinaturalistische Grundlegung der Ethik 149; Guido Küng: Zur Erkenntnistheorie von Franz Brentano 169; Paul Weingartner: Brentano’s criticism of the correspondence theory of truth and the principle “Ens et verum convertuntur” 183; Roderick M. Chisholm: Brentano’s conception of substance and accident 197; Rudolf Haller: Brentanos Sprachkritik, oder dass “man unterscheiden muss was es (hier) zu unterscheiden gibt” 211; Johann Götschl: Brentanos Analyse des Zeitbegriffes 225; Rolf George: Brentano’s relation to Aristotle 249; Liste der Teilnehmer an der Brentano-Konferenz 267.
2. “The Descriptive Psychology of the Brentano School.” Topoi 6 (1987): 1-64.
   Guest editors: Roderick Chisholm and Rudolf Haller.
   Contents: R. M. Chisholm and R. Haller: Introduction 1; Klaus Hedwig: Brentano’s hermeneutics 3; Stephan Körner: On Brentano’s objections to Kant’s theory of knowledge 11; Heiner Rutte: On the problem of inner perception 19; Peter M. Simons: Brentano’s reform of logic 25; Barry Smith: The substance of Brentano’s ontology 39; Enzo Melandri: The ‘Analogia Entis’ according to Franz Brentano: a speculative-grammatical analysis of Aristotle’s ‘Metaphysics’ 51; Roderick M. Chisholm: Brentano’s theory of pleasure and pain 59.
3. La Scuola Di Brentano. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1988.
   Contents: Wilhelm Baumgartner: Die Rolle des deskriptiven Psychologie Franz Brentanos am Beispiel der ‘Wahrnehrung’ 5; Stefano Besoli: La psicologia descrittiva e il primato dell’esperienza. Rilievi su alcune divergenze rilevabili tra il sistema concettuale di Dilthey e quello di Brentano 26; Reinhard Mamitz: Deskriptive Psychologie als unerlässliche Grundlage wissenschaftlicher Philosophie? Eine Darstellung und kritische Analyse des Psychologismus Franz Brentanos 58; Paolo Spinicci: Some observations on the concept of descriptive psychology in the philosophy of Franz Brentano 82; Enzo Melandri: Emozione, sentimento e conoscenza dal punto di vista fenomenologico 93; Kevin Mulligan: Judgings: their parts and counterparts 117; Natale Stucchi: Perception, representation and persuasion in the scientific work of Vittorio Benussi 149; Richard Sylvan: Supplanting maximization, and other utilitarian assumptions, in Western ethical ideology. A satisizing alternative to Brentano’s foundations 167-194.
   Also published as Topoi Supplementary volume 2.
4. “Brentano Et Son École.” Études Philosophiques 64 (2003).
   Index: Jocelyn Benoist: Brentano et son école 1; Wilhelm Baumgartner: Le      contenut et la méthode des philosophies de Franz Brentano et Carl Stumpf 3; Wojciech Zelaniec: Le Brentano de la “Deskriptive Psychologie”: l’homme qui savait décrire (et poursuivait un objectif double en décrivant) 23; Jocelyn Benoist: Sprachkritik ou sémantique: sur le schisme de l’école brentanienne 35; Ronan de Calan: La caractéristique empiriste: la théorie de la rélation de Hume a Ehrenfels 53; Remarques sur      le couple forme/matière. Entre ontologie et grammaire chez Anton Marty 65;      Wioletta Miskiewicz: Réalisme gnoséologique contre réalisme sceptique: Ingarden et la réception de Brentano en Pologne 83; Claire Marin: L’oeil et la main: la “métaphysique du toucher” dans la philosophie française, de Ravaisson à Derrida 99-112.
5. “The School of Brentano and Husserlian Phenomenology.” Studia Phaenomenologica 3 (2003).
   Contents: Ion Tanasescu, Victor Popescu: Introduction 9; Wilhelm Baumgartner: Franz Brentano, “Grossvater” der Phänomenologie 15; Jocelyn Benoist: Quelques remarques sur la doctrine brentanienne de      l’évidence 61; Ion Tanasescu: Ist die Empfindung intentional? Der      Brentanosche Hintergrund einer Kritik Husserls 75; Klaus Hedwig:      “Inseln des Unglücks”. Die Stellung des Schlechten im      Summationsprinzip der Güter. Aristoteles-Brentano-Katkov 99; Victor      Popescu: Espace et mouvement chez Stumpf et Husserl. Une approche méréologique 115;      Claudio Majolino: Le différend logique: jugement et énoncé. Eléments pour une reconstruction du débat entre Husserl et Marty 135;      Dale Jacquette: Meinong on the Phenomenology of Assumption 155; Carlo      Ierna: Husserl on the Infinite 179; Robin Rollinger: Husserl’s Elementary      Logic. The 1896 Lectures In Their Nineteenth Century Context 195;      Bernhardt Waldenfels: Zwischen Sagen und Zeigen. Überlegungen zu Husserls      Theorie der okkasionellen Ausdrücke 215; Bruce Bégout: Percevoir et juger.      Le rôle      de la croyance originelle (Urdoxa) dans la phénoménologie du jugement de      Husserl 229-270.
6. Albertazzi Liliana. “Brentano and Mauthner’s Critique of      Language.” Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz      Brentano Forschung 2, no. 145 (1989): 158.
   “Though different in methodological approach to language, Brentano      and Mauthner share a similar background: Positivism, Aristotelian studies,      empiricist psychology, anti-Kantian stance. The critique of language marks      the point of significant convergence: Brentano’s emphasis of reism and      nominalism goes together with (1) his descriptive-semasiologic critique of      language as a logical doctrine of the categories, and (2) his critique of      language as a genetic semasiology, both bound by the view of the      intentional nature of language. It is pointed out at lenghts that and how      the component of genetic semasiology in Brentano allows comparison with      the communicative, pragmatic and performative perspective of Mauthner’s      Sprachkritik due to a shared emphasis on the rhetorical force of      language.”
7. ———. “Nominalismo E      Critica Delle Idee in Brentano.” Idee      (1990): 217-235.
8. ———. “Brentano, Twardowski, and Polish Scientific      Philosophy.” In Polish Scientific Philosophy. The Lvov-Warsaw School,      edited by Coniglione, Franco, Poli, Roberto and Wolenski, Jan. 11-40.      Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1993.
9. ———. “Brentano, Meinong and Husserl on Internal Time.”      Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung 3      (1993): 89-110.
   “Brentano’s Descriptive Psychology marks a breakthrough into      clarification of internal time, made possible by using his doctrine of      intentionality (and modality) of consciousness. Husserl’s version of      descriptive psychology, a pure phenomenological psychology, according to      its author tries to overcome Brentano’s (naturalistic) description of      internal experience by explicitly considering the intentional content of      mental events, and the different categories of objects as objects of a      possible consciousness. Husserl’s investigations on internal time are an      example of a quite specific sort of genetic inquiry, complementary to the      descriptive one. Meinong, when discussing the relation of representation      and perception of time, differentiates between the time as given in a      representation (act time), in different sorts of (Meinongian) objects      (object time), and in contents (content time). These questions of a      Brentanist temporality problem are reconsidered and brought to a      Husserlian conclusion.”
10. Albertazzi Liliana, and Poli      Roberto, eds. Brentano in Italia. Una Filosofia Rigorosa, Contro      Positivismo E Attualismo. Milano: Guerini, 1993.
    Indice: Giovanni Piana: Presentazione 9; Liliana Albertazzi, Roberto Poli:      Introduzione. Brentano: il puzzle incompleto 11; I Pragmatisti 19. Antonio      Santucci: Franz Brentano e i pragmatisti italiani 21; Francesca Modenato:      Conoscere e volere. L’incontro di Vailati e Calderoni con Brentano 47;      Roberto Poli: Le credenze fra logica e mondo. Reismo, pragmatismo e      common-sense philosophy: alle soglie del problema dell’analiticità 67;      Guido Zingari: Franz Brentano e il problema della conoscenza. Motivi e      tematiche a confronto con autori italiani 91; De Sarlo e la sua Scuola      101; Riccardo Luccio, Caterina Primi: De Sarlo e Brentano 103; Simonetta      Gori-Savellini: Franz Brentano ed Enzo Bonaventura. Dalla psicologia      empirica alla psicologia sperimentale 121; Liliana Albertazzi: Il presente      psichico tra analisi concettuale e laboratorio: Franz Brentano e Renata      Calabresi 131; Benussi e la psicologia della Gestalt 173; Paolo Bozzi:      Vittorio Benussi e la psicologia italiana (intervista a cura di Liana      Albertazzi e Roberto Poli) 175; Natale Stucchi: La psicologia teorica di      tradizione brentaniana in alcuni lavori sperimentali di Vittorio Benussi      193; Mauro Antonelli: Coscienza e temporalità. Vittorio Benussi e la      comprensione del tempo 297; Presenze 235; Wilhelm Baumgartner: I      corrispondenti italiani negli archivi di Brentano 237; Luigi Dappiano:      Martinetti lettore di Brentano 247; Piero Di Giovanni: Franz Brentano e la      biblioteca filosofica di Palermo 261; Inediti. 273; (a) Lettera di Franz      Brentano a Giuseppe Amato Pojero (testo originale, p. 286) 275; (b)      Corrispondenza Brentano-Salvadori (testi originali, p. 316) 299; Indice      dei nomi 335.
11. Albertazzi Liliana. “Die      Theorie Der Indirekten Modifikation.” Brentano      Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung 6 (1996):      263-282.
12. Albertazzi Liliana, Libardi      Massimo, and Poli Roberto, eds. The School of Franz      Brentano. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1996.
    Table of contents: Analytical table of contents IX; Foreword by The      Editors XV; Introduction. Liliana Albertazzi, Massimo Libardi, Roberto      Poli: Brentano and his School: reassembling the puzzle 1; 1. Massimo      Libardi: Franz Brentano (1838-1917) 25; Part I: The pupils 81; 2. Liliana      Albertazzi: Anton Marty (1847-1914) 83; 3. Karl      Schuhmann: Carl Stumpf (1848-1936) 109; 4. Dale Jacquette: Alexius Meinong      (1853-1920) 131; 5. Reinhard Fabian: Christian von Ehrenfels (1859-1932)      161; 6. Liliana Albertazzi: Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) 175; 7. Roberto      Poli: Kazimierz Twardowski (1866-1938) 207; PartII: Topics and influences      233; 8. Wilhelm Baumgartner: Act, content and object 235; 9. Johannes      Brandl: Intentionality 261; 10. Paolo Bozzi: Higher-order objects 285; 11.      Peter Simons: Logic in the Brentano School 305; 12. Barry Smith: Logic and      the Sachverhalt 323; 13. Roberto Poli: Truth theories 343; 14. Jan      Wolenski: Reism in the Brentanist tradition 357: 15. Luigi Dappiano:      Theories of values 377; 16. Liliana Albertazzi: From Kant to Brentano by      Liliana Albertazzi 423; Index of Topics 465; Index of names 467-477.
    “The central idea developed by the contributions to this book is that      the split between analytic philosophy and phenomenology – perhaps the most      important schism in twentieth-century philosophy – resulted from a      radicalization of reciprocal partialities. Both schools of thought share,      in fact, the same cultural background and their same initial stimulus in      the thought of Franz Brentano. And one outcome of the subsequent rift      between them was the oblivion into which the figure and thought of      Brentano have fallen.
    The first step to take in remedying this split is to return to Brentano      and to reconstruct the ‘map’ of Brentanism.
    The second task (which has been addressed by this book) is to revive      interest in the theoretical complexity of Brentano’s thought and of his      pupils and to revitalize those aspects that have been neglected by      subsequent debate within the various movements of Brentanian inspiration.
    We have accordingly decided to organize the book into two introductory      essays followed by two sections (Parts 1 and 2) which systematically      examine Brentano’s thought and that of his followers. The two introductory      essays reconstruct the reasons for the ‘invisibility’, so to speak, of      Brentano and set out the essential features of his philosophical doctrine.      Part 1 of the book then examines six of Brentano’s most outstanding pupils      (Marty, Stumpf, Meinong, Ehrenfels, Husserl and Twardowski). Part 2      contains nine essays concentrating on the principal topics addressed by      the Brentanians.
    In order to facilitate cross-referencing between the various essays      contained in the book, each chapter concludes with a table giving the      other points in the book where the same topics are dealt with.”      (Foreword by the Editors).
13. Albertazzi Liliana.      Introduzione a Brentano. Bari: Laterza, 1999.
14. ———. “Franz Brentano’s Psychology Today. A Programme of Empirical      and Experimental Metaphysics.” Brentano Studien.Internationales      Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung 10 (2003): 107-118.
    “In this article I try to emphasise the following three main points:
    1. Brentano’s metaphysics is not speculative; it is instead a programme      for scientific research. 2. Some components of his metaphysics, especially      those relating to the problem of perceptive continua — and many aspects      of it developed experimentally by his pupils — are today discussed not      only by philosophy but also by the cognitive sciences, more or less      accurately, more or less consciously. 3. Some areas of the cognitive      sciences express the need for a scientifically — even neurophysiologically      — founded theory of intentionality.”
15. ———. “The Psychophysics of the Soul. Aristote and Brentano.”      In Aristote Au Xix Siècle, edited by Thouard, Denis. 249-275. Villeneuve      d’Asq Cédex: Presses Universitaires du Septentrion, 2004.
16. ———. Immanent Realism. An Introduction to Brentano. Dordrecht:      Springer, 2006.
    Contents: Acknowledgements IX; Terminological Note XI; Introduction 1;      Chapter 1. A Life. A Novel 5; Chapter 2. Brentano and Aristotle 43;      Chapter 3. Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint 83; Chapter 4.      Metaphysics and the Science of the Soul 123; Chapter 5. A woodworm in the      Intentional Relation 155; Chapter 6. Ficciones 189; Chapter 7. Continua      233; Chapter 8. Reverse Aristotelianism: Metaphysics of Accidents 269;      Chapter 9. Other Writings: Ethics, Aesthetics and History of Philosophy      295; Chapter 10. A History of Brentano Criticism 313; Chapter 11. A Wager      on the Future 335; Bibliographic Notes 341; References 355; Index of Names      373-378.
17. ———. “Retrieving Intentionality. A Legacy from the Brentano School.”      In The Lvov-Warsaw School. The New Generation, edited by Jadacki, Jacek      Juliusz and Pasniczek, Jacek. 291-314. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2006.
18. Anasvili Valerij.      “Rezeption Franz Brentanos in Russland (Eileitende Materialen).”      Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung      8 (2000): 219-231.
19. Antonelli Mauro.      “Univocità Dell’essere E Intenzionalità Del Conoscere: Saggio Critico      Sulla Genesi E Sulle Fonti Del Pensiero Di Franz Brentano.” Giornale Critico della Filosofia Italiana 49 (1990): 101-123.
20. ———. “Auf Der Suche Nach Der Substanz. Zu Brentano Stellung in      Der Rezeption Der Aristotelischen Ontologie Im 19. Jahrundert.”      Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung 1      (1991): 19-46.
21. ———. Alle Radici Del Movimento      Fenomenologico. Psicologia E Metafisica Del Giovane Franz Brentano. Bologna: Pitagora, 1996.
22. ———. Franz Brentano Psicologo.      Dalla ‘Psicologia Dal Punto Di Vista Empirico’ Alla ‘Psicologia      Descrittiva’. Bologna: Pitagora, 1996.
23. ———. “Franz Brentano Und Die Wiederentdeckung Der      Intentionalitat. Richtigstellung Herkömmlicher Missverständnisse Und      Missdeutungen.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 58-59 (2000): 93-117.
24. ———. Seiendes, Bewusstsein, Intentionalität Im Frühwerk Von Franz      Brentano. Freiburg: K. Alber, 2001.
25. ———. “La Conception De La Vérité Du Jeune Brentano: De La      Dissertation Sur Les Significations Multiples De L’être Aux Leçons De      Mètaphysique.” In Propositions Et États De Choses. Entre Être Et      Sens, edited by Benoist, Jocelyn. 67-86. Paris: Vrin, 2006.
26. ———. “Franz Brentano Et L’      “Inexistence Intentionnelle”.” Philosophiques      36 (2009): 467-487.
27. Aquila Richard. “The Status of Intentional Objects.” New      Scholasticism 45 (1971): 427-456.
28. ———. Intentionality. A Study of Mental Acts. University Park: Pnnsylvania      State University Press, 1977.
29. ———. “Intentional Objects and Kantian Appearances.”      Philosophical Topics 12 (1982): 9-37.
30. Bartok Philip J. “Brentano’s Intentionality Thesis: Beyond the      Analytic and Phenomenological Readings.” Journal of History of Philosophy      43 (2005): 437-460.
    “Philosophers in the analytic and phenomenological traditions have      interpreted Brentano’s intentionality thesis, and his empirical psychology      more generally, in significantly different ways. Disregarding Brentano’s      distinctive psychological method, analytic philosophers have typically      read him as a philosopher of mind, and his intentionality thesis as a      contribution to the Cartesian project of clarifying the distinction      between the mental and the physical. Phenomenologists, while more      attentive to his method, tended to read Brentano as merely “on the      way” to a truly phenomenological approach. I offer a third reading of      Brentano thesis, one that attends to both the motivating concerns and the      distinctive methodological features of his psychological project.”
31. ———. “Reading Brentano on the Intentionality of Ther      Mental.” In Intentionality. Past and Future, edited by Forrai, Gabor      and Kampis, George. 15-24. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2005.
32. Baumgartner Elisabeth. Intentionalität. Begriffsgeschichte Und      Begriffsanwendung in Der Psychologie. Würzburg: Könighausen & Neumann,      1985.
33. Baumgartner Wilhelm. “Die Begründung Von Wahrheit Durch Evidenz:      Der Beitrag Brentanos.” In Geiwssheit Und Gewissen. Festschrift Für      Franz Wiedmann Zum 60. Geburstag, edited by Baumgartner, Wilhelm. 93-116.      Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 1987.
34. ———. “Objects Analysed. Brentano’s Way toward the Identity of      Objects.” Topoi Supplement 4 (1989): 20-30.
35. ———. “Brentanos Und Mills Methode Der Beschreibenden      Analyse.” Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz      Brentano Forschung 2 (1989): 63-78.
36. Baumgartner Wilhelm, and Burkard Franz-Peter. “Franz Brentano:      Eine Skizze Seines Lebens Und Seiner Werke.” In International      Bibliography of Austrian Philosophy 1982/83 – Internationale Bibliographie      Zur Osterreichischen Philosophie, edited by Baumgartner, Wilhelm and      Burkard, Franz-Peter. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1990.
37. Baumgartner Wilhelm, and Simons Peter M. “Brentanos      Mereologie.” Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano      Forschung 4 (1992): 53-77.
38. ———. “Brentano’s Mereology.” Axiomathes.An International      Journal in Ontology and Cognitive Systems 1 (1994): 55-76.
39. Baumgartner Elisabeth, and Baumgartner Wilhelm. “Von Brentano Zu      Kulpe: Die Deskriptive Psychologie Brentanos Und Die ‘Urzburger Schule’      Der Denkpsychologie.” Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der      Franz Brentano Forschung 7 (1997): 31-52.
40. Baumgartner Wilhelm.      “Brentano Un Die Österreischische Philosophie.” In Phenomenology and Analysis. Essays on Central European Philosophy,      edited by Chrudzimski, Arkadiusz and Huemer, Wolfgang. 131-158. Frankfurt:      Ontos Verlag, 2004.
41. Bausola Adriano. Conoscenza E      Moralità in Franz Brentano. Milano: Vita e Pensiero,      1968.
42. ———. “La Dottrina Sul      Giudizio Di Esistenza E La Critica Ad Alcuni Argomenti Per L’esistenza Di      Dio in Franz Brentano.” Rivista di Filosofia      Neo-Scolastica 92 (2000): 282-294.
43. Bell John L. “Continuity and the Logic of Perception.”      Transcendent Philosophy 1 (2000): 1-7.
44. Benoist Jocelyn. “Qu’est-Ce Qu’un Jugement? Brentano, Frege,      Husserl.” Études Phénoménologiques 14, no. 27-28 (1998): 169-192.
45. Bergmann Hugo. “Brentano’s Theory of Induction.” Philosophy      and Phenomenological Research 5 (1945): 281-292.
    Reprinted in: Linda McAlister (ed.): – The philosophy of Brentano – pp.      213-223.
46. ———. “Brentano on the History of Greek Philosophy.”      Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 26 (1965): 94-99.
47. ———. “Franz      Brentano.” Revue Internationale de Philosophie 20 (1966): 349-372.
48. Bergmann Gustav. Realism. A Critique of Brentano and Meinong. Madison:      University of Wisconsin Press, 1967.
    Reprinted: Frankfurt, Ontos Verlag, 2004
49. Berti Enrico. “Brentano and Aristotle’s Metaphysics.” In      Whose Aristotle? Whose Aristotelianism?, edited by Sharples, Robert W.,      135-149. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001.
    “Franz Brentano’s interpretation of Aristotle’s philosophy has      attracted the attention of scholars right up to the present day. It has      been considered important above all for two reasons: a) because it      constituted the origin of the famous theory of intentionality, which was      found in his book on Aristotle’s Psychology (1867); and b) because of the      influence that the theory of the several senses of being, developed in his      Dissertation of 1862, exercised on the birth of Heidegger’s thought.      However, Brentano’s attempt to attribute to Aristotle the concept of      creation and the theory of the immortality of the human soul has been      almost completely rejected.
    The first point was illustrated particularly by R. George and R. Sorabji,      (1) but Brentano’s interpretation of Aristotelian psychology was also at      the centre of the debate on the “Mind-Body Problem”, which      involved several important philosophers, such as H. Putnam, the same R.      Sorabji, M. Burnyeat, M. C. Nussbaum and others. (2) A part of his book on      Aristotle’s Psychology was included in the recent collection of Essays on      Aristotle’s “De anima”.(3) The second point, to which Heidegger      himself drew attention in his famous letter to Father Richardson, (4) was      studied first by F. Volpi and afterwards by many others, including myself.      (5)
    The interpretation of Aristotle’s theology expounded by Brentano in an      additional essay to Aristotle’s Psychology, was criticised by Eduard      Zeller in the third edition of his monumental history of Greek philosophy      (1878). This criticism induced Brentano to write an essay on Aristotle’s      Creationism (1882), followed by a reply from Zeller, a new intervention on      the part of Brentano and a further reply by Zeller (1883), which seemed to      close the discussion.(6) But Brentano reprinted his essay of 1882, with      some additions, in the volume Aristoteles Lehre vom Ursprung der      menschlichen Geistes (1911) (7) and in the same year he also published a      monograph, Aristoteles and seine Weltanschauung, where he repeated the      main lines of his interpretation. (8) The controversy was definitively      resolved, in my opinion, only with W. D. Ross’s introduction to his      edition of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, where the famous English Aristotelian      refuted any possibility of conceiving Aristotle’s God as a creator,      explicitly attacking the interpretation proposed by Brentano.(9)
    On this occasion I do not wish to return to the theory of intentionality,      even if I will make some reference to it. I would like, on the contrary,      to see what consequences the interpretation of Aristotle’s ontology,      developed by Brentano in his dissertation of 1862, and his interpretation      of Aristotle’s theology, developed in his later writings, had for the      modern and contemporary image of Aristotle; that is, how Brentano’s      Aristotle influenced contemporary philosophers’ judgements of Aristotle’s      metaphysics.” pp. 135-137

    (1) Cf. R. George, ‘Brentano’s Relation to Aristotle’, in R.M. Chisholm      and R. Haller (eds.), Die Philosophie Franz Brentanos, Amsterdam: Rodopi,      1978, 249-266; R. Sorabji, ‘From Aristotle to Brentano; the Development of      the Concept of Intentionality’, in H. Blumenthal and H. Robinson (eds.),      Aristotle and the Later Tradition, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy      Supplementary Volume, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991.
    (2) I tried to sum up this debate in E. Berti, ‘Aristotele e il      “Mind-Body Problem’, Iride. Filosofia e discussione pubblica 11,      1998, 43-62.
    (3) Die Psychologie des Aristoteles, insbesondere seine Lehre vom Nous      Poietikos, Mainz: Kirchheim, 1867, was republished by R. George, Hamburg:      Meiner, 1967, and was translated into English by R. George, Berkeley:      University of California Press, 1977.
    The first chapter, ‘Nous poietikos: Survey of earlier interpretations’,      was included in M. C. Nuussbaum and A. O. Rorty (eds.), Essays on      Aristotle’s De anima, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1992, 313-341.
    (4) This letter (1962), published by Heidegger as Preface to W.J.      Richardson, Heidegger, The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1963, has been developed in      his lecture ‘Mein Weg in die Phanomenologie’ (1963), in id., Zur Sache des      Denkens, Tubingen, Mohr, 1969, 81-90.
    (5) Cf.      F. Volpi, Heidegger e Brentano, Padua: Cedam, 1976 (Pubblicazioni della      Scuola di perfezionamento in Filosofia dell’Università di Padova), and      Heidegger e Aristotele, Padova: Daphne, 1984; J. Taminiaux, Le regard et      l’excédent, The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1977, 156-182; E. Berti, Aristotele nel      Novecento, Rome-Bari: Laterza, 1992, 44-111; Th. Kisiel,      The Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time, Berkeley: University of      California Press, 1993.
    (6) F. Brentano, ‘Ueber den Creatianismus des Aristoteles’, S.-B. d. K.      Akad. d. Wiss., philos.hist. Kl., 100, Wien 1882, 95-126; E. Zeller,      ‘Aristoteles Lehre von der Ewigkeit des menschlichen Geistes’, S.-B. d.      Preuss. Akad. d. Wiss., Berlin 1882 (repr. in Zeller’s Kleine Schriften,      Berlin 1910); F. Brentano, Offener Brief an Herrn professor Dr. Eduard      Zeller, Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1883; E. Zeller, Deutsche      Literaturanzeigung, 1883.
    (7) Leipzig: Veit & Comp., 1911 (second edition, with an Introduction      by R. George who illustrates the controversy, Hamburg: Meiner, 1980). I examined this topic in E.      Berti, ‘Zeller e Aristotele’, Annali della Scuola Normale Superiore di      Pisa, cl. di lett. e filos., s. III, vol. XIX.3,      Pisa 1989, 1233 -1254.
    (8) Leipzig: Quelle & Meyer. In preparing this monograph Brentano      wrote a series of notes on Aristotle, which remained unpublished until      after his death: cf. F. Brentano, Uber Aristoteles. Nachgelassene      Aufsatze, hrsg. v. R. George, Hamburg: Meiner, 1986.
    (9) Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924, I,      cxxxiii-cxxxix, cxlix, cliii-cliv. I occupied myself with this discussion in E.      Berti, ‘Da chi è amato it motore immobile? Su Aristotele, Metaph. XII 6-7’, Methexis 10, 1997, 59-82.

50. Besoli Stefano. “Brevi      Cenni Intorno Alla Recezione Brentaniana Della Filosofia Di Thomas      Reid.” Annali di discipline fisosofiche dell’Università di Bologna (1986):      25-30.
51. Binder Thomas. “Die Brentano Gesellschaft Und Das Brentano-Archiv      in Prag.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 58-59 (2000): 533-565.
52. ———. “Die Prager Brentano Gesellschaft.” Brentano      Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung 8 (2000):      259-286.
53. Blackmore John. Ludwig Boltzmann: His Later Life and Philosophy,      1900-1906. Book Two: The Philosopher. Dordrecht: Kuwer, 1995.
    See Chapter Six: Franz Brentano pp. 135-153 and Seven: Critical Realism      pp. 155-180.
54. ———. “Franz Brentano and the University of Vienna Philosophical      Society 1888-1938.” In The Brentano Puzzle, edited by Poli, Roberto.      73-92. Brookfiled: Ashgate, 1998.
55. Brandl Johannes. Brentanos Urteilslehre. Eine Studie Über Die Logische      Form Von Akt Und Inhalt. Graz: Forschungsstelle und Dokumentationszentrum      für Österreichische Philosophie, 1987.
56. ———. “Intentionality.” Chap. The School of Franz Brentano,      edited by Albertazzi, Liliana, Libardi, Massimo and Poli, Roberto.      261-284. Kluwer: Dordrecht, 1996.
57. Brentano J.C.M. “The Manuscripts of Franz Brentano.” Revue      Internationale de Philosophie 20 (1966): 477-482.
58. Brown Deborah. “Immanence and Individuation: Brentano and the      Scholastics on Knowledge of Singulars.” Monist 83 (2000): 22-46.
59. Buzzoni Marco. “Brentano,      Sprache, Ontologie Und Person.” Brentano      Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung 1 (1988):      153-187.
60. Campos Eliam. Die Kantkritik Brentanos. Bonn: Bouvier, 1979.
61. Chisholm Roderick M. “Intentional Inexistence.” In      Perceiving. 168-185. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1957.
    Chapter XI; reprinted in: Linda McAlister (ed.) – The philosophy of      Brentano – pp. 140-150
62. ———, ed. Realism and the Background of Phenomenology. Atascadero:      Ridgeview, 1960.
    Contents: Preface V; Editor’s Introduction 3; Selections. 1. Franz      Brentano: The distinction between mental and physical phenomena 39; 2.      Franz Brentano: Presentation and judgment form. Two distinct fundamental      classes 62, 3. Franz Brentano: Genuine and fictitious objects 76; 4.      Alexius Meinong: The theory of objects 76; 5. Edmund Husserl:      Phenomenology 118; 6. Edmund Husserl: Phenomenology and anthropology 129;      7. H. A. Prichard: Appearances and reality 143; 8. E. B. Holt, W. T.      Marvin, W. P. Montague, R. B. Perry, W. B. Pitkin, and E. G. Spaulding:      Introduction to ‘The New Realism’ 151; 9. Samuel Alexander: The basis of      realism 186; 10. Bertrand Russell: The ultimate constituents of matter      223; 11. Arthur C. Lovejoy: A temporalistic realism 238; 12. G. E. Moore:      A defense of common sense 255; Selected bibliography 283; Index 305-308.
    “The translations of Brentano and Meinong and the second translation      of Husserl (“Phenomenology and Anthropology”) have not      previously been published. The selections from Brentano were translated by      D. B. Terrell, of the University of Minnesota, and are taken, with his      kind permission, from his translation of Brentano’s Psychologie vom      empirischen Standpunkt. Meinong’s “The Theory of Objects” was      translated by Isaac Levi, of Western Reserve University, D. B. Terrell,      and Roderick M. Chisholm. Husserl’s “Phenomenology” was      translated by C. V. Salmon, of Belfast University; his “Phenomenology      and Anthropology” by Richard Schmitt; of Brown University.”      (from the Preface)
63. ———. “Brentano’s Theory of Correct and Incorrect Emotion.”      Revue Internationale de Philosophie 20 (1966): 395-415.
    Reprinted in: Linda McAlister – The philosophy of Brentano – pp. 160-175
64. ———. Brentano on Descriptive Psychology and the Intentional. Vol.      Phenomenology and existentialism, Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1967.
65. ———. “Beyond Being and Nonbeing. Beiträge Zur Meinong-Forschung.”      In Jenseits Von Sein Und Nichtsein, edited by Haller, Rudolf. Graz:      Akademische Druck- u. Verlagsanstalt, 1972.
    Acts of the Colloquium held in Graz September, 30th – October, 4th 1970
66. ———. “Brentano’s Conception of Substance and Accident.”      Grazer Philosophische Studien 5 (1978): 197-210.
    “Brentano uses terms in place of predicates (e.g. “a      thinker” in place of “thinks”) and characterizes the      “is” of predication in terms of the part-whole relation. Taking      as his ontological data certain intentional phenomena that are apprehended      with certainty, he conceives the substance-accident relation as a      define-able type of part-whole relation which we can apprehend in      “inner perception”. He is then able to distinguish the following      types of individual or ens reale: substances; primary individuals which      are not substances; accidents; aggregates; and boundaries.”
67. ———. “Brentano’s Analysis of the Consciousness of Time.” In      Midwest Studies in Philosophy. Volume Vi. The Foundations of Analytic      Philosophy, edited by French, Peter A., Uehling Jr, Theodore E. and      Wettstein, Howard K., 3-16. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,      1981.
    “Franz Brentano’s conception of philosophical analysis is illustrated      by his aanalysis of our consciousness of time. The analysandum is not a      linguistic expression or a concept; it is an experience of a certain sort.      Hence the analysis might be called “phenomenological,” but      Brentano prefers to say it is a matter of “descriptive      psychology.”
    An analysis of our consciousness of time is not, or course, an analysis of      time. Hence Brentano’s analysis is consistent with a number of different      conceptions of time. But it does presuppose that tense is to be taken      seriously. In other words, Brentano does not accept the philosophical      view, advocated by many contemporary philosophers of science, according to      which distinctions of tense are merely “subjective” or otherwise      “illusory.” Nor does he believe that all truths can he expressed      in untensed sentences.
    I shall begin by formulating what Brentano takes to be a fundamental      problem of descriptive psychology — that of accurately describing our      awareness of temporal succession. Then I shall set forth the development      of his views with respect to this problem.”
68. ———. Brentano and Meinong Studies. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1982.
    Contents: Foreword 1; 1. Brentano’s theory of Substance and Accident 3; 2.      Brentano’s theory of Judgment 17; 3. Homeless objects 37; 4. Beyond Being      and Nonbeing 53; 5. Correct and incorrect emotion 68; 6. Objectives and      intrinsic value 80; 7. The quality of pleasure and displeasure 92; 8.      Supererogation and offence 98; 9. Beginnings and endings 114-124.
    “I present these papers on Brentano and Meinong in the hope that they      will lead the reader back to the originai sources. Some of the papers are      expositions and commentaries. Others are developments of certain      suggestions first made by Brentano or by Meinong.
    The first two papers are concerned with the basic presuppositions of      Brentano’s theoretical philosophy. “Brentano’s Theory of Substance      and Accident” was presented to the Congress on the Philosophy of      Franz Brentano held in Graz in September 1977; it first appeared in the      Grazer Philosophische Studien, Vol. V (1978). The second paper –      “Brentano’s Theory of Judgment” – has not been published before;      but a preliminary version of part of it, entitled “Brentano’s      Nonpropositional Theory of Judgment,” appeared in the Midwest Studies      in Philosophy, Vol. I (1976). It should be noted that Brentano’s      Kategorienlehre, to which many references are made in these two papers,      has now been translated into English as The Theory of Categories, The      Hague; Martinus Nijhoff 1981.
    (…)
    The four papers that follow are concerned with the theory of value, as it      had been conceived by Brentano and developed by Meinong. “Correct and      Incorrect Emotion” and “The Quality of Pleasure and      Displeasure” are both adapted from “Brentano’s Theory of Correct      and Incorrect Emotion,” which first appeared in the Brentano issue of      the Revue Internationale de Philosophie, Vol. 20 (1966).
    (…)
    The final paper – “Beginnings and Endings” – is a revision of a      paper entitled “Brentano als analytischer Metaphysiker,” which      first appeared in the special volume of Conceptus entitled Österreichische      Philosophie und ihr Einfluss auf die analytische Philosophie der      Gegenwart, Jg. XI (1977), Nr. 28-30, pp. 77-82. A later version appeared      in Time and Cause, edited by Peter Van Inwagen (Dordrecht: D. Reidel,      1980), pp. 17-25. It has been revised once again for the present volume.
    I hope that these essays will be thought of as carrying out the tradition      of the Brentano school.” (From the Foreword)
69. ———. Brentano and Intrinsic Value. Cambridge: Cambridge University      Press, 1986.
70. ———. “The Object of Sensation: A Brentano Study.” Topoi 8      (1989): 3-8.
71. ———. “The Formal Structure of the Intentional: A Metaphysical      Study.” Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano      Forschung 3 (1991): 11-18.
    “What is the metaphysical significance of what Brentano has shown us      about intentionality? It is the fact that intentional phenomena have      logical or structural features that are not shared by what is not      psychological.
    It was typical of British empiricism, particularly that of Hume, to      suppose that consciousness is essentially sensible. The objects of      consciousness were thought to be primarily such objects as sensations and      their imagined or dreamed counterparts. In the Psychologie vom empirischen      Standpunkt, Brentano makes clear that intentional phenomena need not be      sensible. He is aware that, even if intentional phenomena are always      accompanied by sensible or sensational phenomena, they are not themselves      sensational or sensible phenomena. And the presence of certain intentional      attitudes is at least as certain and indubitable for us as is the presence      of our sensations. If I make a certain judgment or ask myself a certain      question, then I can know directly and immediately that I make that      judgment or ask that question. (This is not to say, of course, that every      intentional attitude may be the object of such certainty. Perhaps there is      a sense in which you may be said to like or to dislike a certain thing      without realizing that you like or dislike that thing.)
    If I can know directly and immediately that I am making a certain      judgment, then, I can know what it is to make such a judgment. And if I      know what it is to make a judgment, then, in making the judgment I can      know directly and immediately that there is a certain individual thing –      namely, the one who makes the judgment. Arid I, of course, am the one who      makes my judgments and does my thinking. The same is true, obviously, of      my other intentional activities – such activities as wondering, fearing,      hoping, desiring, considering, liking and disliking.”
72. ———. “Spatial Continuity and the Theory of Part and Whole. A      Brentano Study.” Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz      Brentano Forschung 4 (1993): 11-24.
    “The concepts of a spatially continuous substance, of spatial      dimension and of spatial boundary are here “analyzed out” of the      concepts of individual thing, of constituent and of coincidence. The      analysis is based upon the theory of spatial coincidence that was      developed by Brentano. Its presuppositions are essentially these: (1) if      there are spatial objects of any kind, then there are continuous spatial      substances. (2) such substances are possibly such that they are not      constituents of any individual thing; and (3) they contain constituents      (namely, boundaries) which are necessarily such that they are constituents      of spatial substances.”
73. ———. “Brentano on “Unconscious Consciousness”.” In      Consciousness, Knowledge and Truth, edited by Poli, Roberto. 153-160.      Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1993.
74. ———. “Ontologically Dependent Entities.” Philosophy and      Phenomenological Research 54 (1994): 499-507.
75. Chrudzimski Arkadiusz.      “Die Theorie Der Intentionalität Bei Franz Brentano.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 57 (1999): 45-66.
76. ———. “Die Theorie Des Zeitbewusstseins Franz Brentano Im Licht      Der Unpublizierten Manuskripte.” Brentano Studien.Internationales      Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung 8 (2000): 149-161.
77. ———. Intentionalitätstheorie Beim Frühen Brentano. Dodrdrecht: Kluwer,      2001.
78. ———. “Die Wahrheitstheorie Franz Brentanos.” In Philosophie      – Wissenschaft – Wirtschaft. Miteinander Denken, Voneinander Lernen.      Vorträge Des Vi. Kongresses Der Österreichischen Gesellschaft Für      Philosophie, Linz 1.-4. Juni 2000, edited by Neumaier, Otto and Born,      Rainer. 456-461. Wien: Verlag Hõlder-Pichler-Tempsky, 2001.
79. ———. “Von Brentano Zu      Ingarden: Die Phänomenologische Bedeutungslehre.” Husserl Studies 18 (2002): 185-208.
80. ———. “Brentano Und      Meinong. Zur Ontologie Der Denkobjekte.” In      Substanz Und Identität. Beiträge Zur Ontologie, edited by Löffler,      Winfried. 155-166. Paderborn: Mentis-Verlag, 2002.
81. ———. “Brentano’s Late Ontology.” Brentano      Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung 10 (2003):      221-236.
    “In the present paper I want to give an interpretation of Brentano’s      late, nominalistic ontology. There are two aspects of this theory: the      conception of individual properties containing their substances, presented      mainly in the fragments collected in Brentano’s Theory of Categories and      the conceptualistic reduction virtually involved in Brentano’s definition      of truth.”
82. ———. Die Ontologie Franz Brentanos. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic      Publishers, 2004.
83. ———. Intentionalität, Zeitbewusstsein Und Intersubjektivität. Studien      Zur Phänomenologie Von Brentano Bis Ingarden. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag,      2005.
84. ———. “Brentano, Husserl Und Ingarden Über Die Intentionale      Gegenstände.” In Existence, Culture, and Persons. The Ontology of      Roman Ingarden., edited by Chrudzimski, Arkadiusz. 83-114. Frankfurt am      Mein: Ontos Verlag, 2005.
85. Chrudzimski Arkadiusz, and Lukasiewicz Dariusz, eds. Actions,      Products, and Things. Brentano and Polish Philosophy. Frankfurt: Ontos      Verlag, 2006.
    Contents: Introduction 7; Dale Jacquette: Twardowski, Brentano’s dilemma,      and the content-object distinction 9; Maria van der Schaar: On the      ambiguities of the term Judgement: an evaluation of Twardowski’s      distinction between action and product 35; Arianna Betti: The strange case      of Savonarola and the painted fish: on the Bolzanization of Polish thought      55, Peter Simons: Things and truths: Brentano and Lesniewski, ontology and      logic 83; Arkadiusz Chrudzimski: The young Lesniewski on existential      propositions 107; Barry Smith: On the phases of Reism 107; Dariusz      Lukasiewicz: Brentanian philosophy and Czezowski’s conception of existence      183; Jan Wolenski: Brentanism and the rise of formal semantics 217; Notes      on contributors 233; Index of names 235.
86. Courtine Jean-François.      “L’aristotélisme De Franz Brentano.” Études      Phénoménologiques 14, no. 27-28 (1998): 7-50.
87. ———. “Brentano Et L’ontologie.” In Compléments De Substance.      Études Sur Les Propriétés Accidentelles Offertes À Alain De Libera, edited      by Erismann, Christophe and Schniewind, Alexandrine. 197-214. Paris: Vrin,      2008.
88. Crane Tim. “Brentano’s Concept of Intentional Inexistence.”      In The Austrian Contribution to Analytic Philosophy, edited by Textor,      Mark. 20-35. New York: Routledge, 2006.
89. Dambska Izydora. “François Brentano Et La Pensée Philosophique En      Pologne: Casimir Twardowski Et Son École.” Grazer Philosophische      Studien 5 (1978): 117-130.
90. Danzer Robert. Das Allgemeine Und Das Besondere Zur Ontologie Franz      Brentanos. Gelsenkirchen: Eurofamilia GmbH, 1965.
91. Deely John. “The Ontological Status of Intentionality.” New      Scholasticism 46 (1972): 220-233.
92. Dölling Evelyn. “Brentanos Und Freges Urteilslehre — Ein      Vergleich.” In Philosophie Und Logik. Frege-Kolloquien, Jena,      1989/1991, edited by Stelzner, Werner. 24-32. Berlin: de Gruyter, 1993.
93. ———. “Kritik Des Urteilslehre: Land Versus Brentano, Mit Blick      Auf Frege.” Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz      Brentano Forschung 7 (1997): 123-146.
94. Drummond John. “From Intentionality to Intensionality and      Back.” Études Phénoménologiques 14, no. 27-28 (1998): 89-126.
95. Dubois James. “Investigating Brentano’s Reism.” Brentano      Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung 6 (1996):      283-296.
96. Eaton Howard Ormsby. The Austrian Philosophy of Values. Norman:      University of Oklahoma Pres, 1930.
97. Ehrenfels Christian von. “Über Brentano Und Meinong.” In      Metaphysik. 426-429. München: Philosophia, 1990.
    Vol. 4 of the Philososphische Schriften.
98. English Jacques. “Pourquoi Et Comment Husserl En Est Venu À      Critiquer Brentano.” Études Phénoménologiques 14, no. 27-28 (1998):      51-88.
99. Fano Vincenzo. La Filosofia      Dell’evidenza. Saggio Sull’epistemologia Di Franz Brentano. Bologna: CLUEB, 1993.
100. ———. “The Categories of Consciousness: Brentano’s      Epistemology.” Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz      Brentano Forschung 4 (1993): 101-130.
     “The present investigation reformulates a few Brentanian ideas      concerning what is mental. In particular, an attempt to define the      categorial structure implicit in the notion of consciousness and in that      of inner perception, keeping in mind their connections with external      perception and with unconscious, is outlined. Within the mental field is      observed a formal violation of some elementary rules of ontology and      mereology, and such violation can be interpreted in terms of an infinite      multiplicity of the mental field itself.”
101. Fisette Denis, and Fréchette      Guillaume, eds. À L’école De Brentano. De Würzbourg À Vienne. Paris: Vrin,      2007.
     Table des matières: Denis Fisette et Guillaume Fréchette: Préface 7; Denis      Fisette et Guillaume Fréchette: Les legs de Brentano 13; Edmund Husserl:      Souvenirs de Franz Brentano 163; Carl Stumpf: Souvenirs de Franz Brentano      175; Christian Ehrenfels; Sur les qualités de forme 225; Alexius Meinong:      Sur les objets d’ordre supérieur et leur rapport à la perception interne      261; Kazimierz Twardowski: Fonctions et formations 343; Anton Marty: Sur      le rapport entre la grammaire et la logique 385; Références      bibliographiques 423; Index des noms propres 441-446
102. Fisette Denis. “Descriptive Psychology and Natural Sciences:      Husserl’s Early Criticism of Brentano.” In Philosophy, Phenomenology,      Sciences. Essays in Commemoration of Edmund Husserl, edited by Ierna,      Carlo, Jacobs, Hanne and Mattens, Filip. 135-167. Dordrecht: Springer,      2010.
103. Føllesdal Dagfinn. “Brentano and Husserl on Intentional Objects      and Perception.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 5 (1978): 83-94.
     Reprinted in: Hubert Dreyfus (ed.) – Husserl, intentionality and cognitive      science – Cambridge, MIT Press 1982 pp. 31-41.

     “The article is a comparative critical discussion of the views of      Brentano and Husserl on intentional objects and on perception. Brentano’s      views on intentional objects are first discussed, with special attention      to the problems connected with the status of the intentional objects. It      is then argued that Husserl overcomes these problems by help of his notion      of noema. Similarly, in the case of perception, Brentano’s notion of      physical phenomena is argued to be less satisfactory than Husserl’s notion      of hyle, whose role in Husserl’s theory of perception is briefly      sketched.”

104. Fugali Edoardo. Die Zeit Des Selbst Und Die Zeit Des Seienden.      Bewusstsein Und Inneren Sinn Bei Franz Brentano. Würzburg: Königshausen      & Neumann, 2004.
     Italian      edition: Il tempo del sé e il tempo dell’essere. Coscienza e senso interno      in Franz Brentano, Napoli, La Città del Sole, 2005.
105. ———. “Toward the Rebirth of Aristotelian Psychology:      Trendelenburg and Brentano.” In Psychology and Philosophy. Inquiries      into the Soul from Late Scholasticism to Contemporary Philosophy, edited      by Heinämaa, Sara and Reuter, Martina. 179-202. Dordrecht: Springer, 2008.
106. Galewicz Wlodzimierz. “Die Moglichkeit Der Selbstwahrnehmung Bei      Brentano.” Conceptus 25 (1991): 49-57.
107. ———. “Substanz Und Individuation in Brentanos      Kategorienlehre.” Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz      Brentano Forschung 4 (1993): 79-88.
108. ———. “Brentano Un Der      Epistemologische Fundamentalismus.” Brentano      Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung 8 (2000):      85-106.
109. George Rolf. “Brentano’s Relation to Aristotle.” Grazer      Philosophische Studien 5 (1978): 249-266.
     “The paper tries to illustrate the influence of Aristotle’s thought      upon Brentano by arguing that the view that all psychological phenomena      have objects was proably derived from the Aristotelian conception that the      mind can know itself only en parergo, and that this knowledge presupposes      that some other thing be in the mind “objectively”. Brentano’s      contribution to Aristotle scholarship is illustrated by reviewing some of      his arguments against Zeller’s claim that Aristotle’s God, contemplating      only himself, is ignorant of the world. The paper concludes with an attempt      to explain the relative neglect into which Brentano’s exegetical efforts      have fallen.”
110. Gilson Étienne. “Franz Brentano’s Interpretation of Mediaeval      Philosophy.” Mediaeval Studies 1 (1939): 1-10.
     Reprinted in: Linda McAlister: – The philosophy of Brentano – pp. 56-67
111. Gilson Lucie. La Psychologie      Descriptive Selon Franz Brentano. Paris: Vrin, 1955.
112. ———. Méthode Et Métaphysique Selon Franz Brentano. Paris: Vrin, 1955.
113. ———. “Science Et Philosophie Selon Franz Brentano.” Revue      Internationale de Philosophie 20 (1966): 416-433.
     Translated in: Linda McAlister – The philosophy of Brentano – pp. 68-79
114. Grossmann Reinhardt. “Non Existent Objects: Recent Work on      Brentano and Meinong.” American Philosophical Quarterly 6 (1969):      17-32.
115. Gutierrez-Cortines Juan. Das Bewusstsein, Die Seienden Und Ihre      Beziehungen in Der Philosophie Franz Brentanos. Hamburg1972.
116. Haldane John. “Brentano’s Problem.” Grazer Philosophische      Studien 35 (1989): 1-32.
117. Haller Rudolf. “Brentanos Sprachkritik, Oder Dass “Man      Unterscheiden Muss Was Es (Hier) Zu Unterscheiden Gibt”.” Grazer      Philosophische Studien 5 (1978): 211-224.
     Reprinted in: R. Haller – Studien zur Österreichischen Philosophie –      Amsterdam., Rodopi, 1979 pp. 23-36
118. ———. “Franz Brentano, Ein Philosoph Des Empirismus.”      Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung 1      (1988): 19-30.
119. Hedwig Klaus. “Der Scholastische Kontext Des Intentionalen Bei      Brentano.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 5 (1978): 67-82.
120. ———. “Intention: Outlines for the History of a Phenomenological      Concept.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 39 (1979):      326-340.
121. ———. “Brentano’s Hermeneutics.” Topoi 6 (1987): 3-10.
122. ———. “Die Historischen      Voraussetzungen Un Die Rezeption Brentanos.” Brentano      Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung 1 (1988):      31-45.
123. Henry Desmond Paul. “Brentano and Some Medieval      Mereologists.” Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz      Brentano Forschung 4 (1993): 25-34.
     “Discussion of what Brentano calls the ‘strange arithmetic’ involved      in the connumeration of overlapping objects is also to be found in      Abelard, John Wyclif, and in Leibniz. Brentano’s divergence from the      commonly-held medieval distinction between X-part and part-of-X may be      partially explained by his adherence to a theory of body resembling that      which occurs in a twelfth-century compendium of Porretan logic.”
124. Hickerson Ryan. The History of Intentionality: Theories of      Consciousness from Brentano to Husserl. London: Continuum International      Publishing Group, 2007.
125. Hillebrand Franz. Die Neuen Theorien Der Kategorischen Schlüsse. Eine      Logische Untersuchung. Wien: Hölder, 1981.
126. Hossack Keith. “Reid and Brentano on Consciousness.” In The      Austrian Contribution to Analytic Philosophy, edited by Textor, Mark.      36-63. New York: Routledge, 2006.
127. Husserl Edmund. “Erinnerungen an Franz Brentano.” In Zur      Kenntnins Seines Lebens Und Siner Lehre. Mit Beiträgen Von C. Stumpf Und      E. Husserl. 151-167. München, 1919.
     Translated in: Linda McAlister (ed.) – The philosophy of Brentano – pp.      47-55
128. Ingarden Roman. “Le      Concept De Philosophie Chez Franz Brentano. Première Partie.” Archives de Philosophie (1969): 458-475.
129. ———. “Le Concept De      Philosophie Chez Franz Brentano. Deuxième Partie.”      Archives de Philosophie (1969): 609-638.
130. Ion Tanasescu, ed. Franz Brentano’s Metaphysics and Psychology. Upon      the Sesquicentennial of Franz Brentano’s Dissertation Bucharest: Zeta      Books, 2012.
131. Jacquette Dale. “The Origins of Gegenstandstheorie: Immanent and      Transcendent Intentional Objects in Brentano, Twardowski, and Meinong.”      Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung 3      (1991): 177-202.
     “The origins of object theory in the philosophical psychology and      semantics of Alexius Meinong and the Graz school can be traced both to the      insight and failure of Franz Brentano’s immanent objectivity or      intentional in-existence thesis. The immanence thesis is documented,      together with its critical reception in Alois Höfler’s Logik, Twardowski’s      Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellungen, and Meinong’s mature      Gegenstandstheorie, in which immanent thought content and transcendent      intentional object are distinguished, and Brentano’s thesis of immanent      intentionality as the mark of the mental is reinterpreted to imply that      only content is the immanently intentional component of presentations.      Brentano’s thought from the early immanence thesis through the so-called      Immanenzkrise and his later reism is explored against the background of      his students’ reactions to the original 1874 intentionality thesis and its      idealist implications, in the emergence of Meinong’s object theory and      Edmund Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology. Finally, Brentano’s reism      in the later ontology is critically examined, as his solution to ontic      problems of immanent intentionality, limiting intentional objects to      transcendent concrete particulars.”
132. ———. “Brentano’s Concept of Intentionality.” In The      Cambridge Companion to Brentano, edited by Jacquette, Dale. 98-130.      Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
133. ———. “Introduction: Brentano’s Philosophy.” In The Cambridge      Companion to Brentano, edited by Jacquette, Dale. 1-19. Cambridge:      Cambridge University Press, 2001.
134. ———, ed. The Cambridge Companion to Brentano. Cambridge: Cambridge      University Press, 2004.
     Contents: List of contributors XIII; Acknowledgments XVII; List of      abbreviations XVIII; Chronology XX-XXII; 1. Introduction: Brentano’s      philosophy by Dale Jacquette 1; 2. Brentano’s relation to Aristotle by      Rolf George and Glen Koehn 20; 3. Judging correctly: Brentano and the      reform of elementary logic by Peter Simons 45; 4. Brentano on the mind 66;      5. Brentano’s concept of intentionality 98; 6. Reflections on      intentionality 131; 7. Brentano’s epistemology 149; 8. Brentano on      judgment and truth by Charles Parsons 168; 9. Brentano’s ontology: from      conceptualism to reism by Arkadiusz Chrudzimski and Barry Smith 197; 10.      Brentano’s value theory: beauty, goodness, and the concept of correct      emotion by Wilhelm Baumgartner and Lynn Pasquerella 220; 11. Brentano on      religion and natural theology by Susan F. Krantz Gabriel 237; 12. Brentano      and Husserl by Robin D. Rollinger 255; 13. Brentano’s impact on      twentieth-century philosophy by Karl Schuhmann 277; Bibliography 298;      Index 316-322.
135. Kamitz Reinhard. “Acts and Relations in Brentano.” Analysis      22 (1962): 73-78.
136. ———. “Franz Brentano. Wahrheit Und Evidenz.” In      Grundprobleme Der Grossen Philosophen: Philosophie Der Neuzeit Iii, edited      by Speck, Josef. 160-197. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1983.
137. ———. “Die Rolle Der Deskriptiven Psychologie in Der Logik      Brentanos.” Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz      Brentano Forschung 2 (1989): 79-90.
138. Kastil Alfred. Die Philosophie Franz Brentanos. Eine Einführung in      Seine Lehre. Bern: A. Francke, 1951.
139. Körner Stephan. “Über Brentanos Reismus Und Die Extensionale      Logik.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 5 (1978): 29-44.
140. ———. “On Brentano’s Objections to Kant’s Theory of      Knowledge.” Topoi 6 (1987): 11-17.
141. Kotarbinski Tadeusz.      “Franz Brentano Comme Réiste.” Revue      Internationale de Philosophie 20 (1966): 459-476.
     Translated in: Linda McAlister – The philosophy of Brentano – pp. 194-203
142. Krantz Susan. “Brentano’s Argument against Aristotle for the      Immateriality of the Soul.” Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch      der Franz Brentano Forschung 1 (1988): 63-74.
     “The Aristotelian conception of the soul as Brentano understood it is      examined, with respect to the nature of the soul and mainly to what      Aristotle called the sensitive soul, since this is where the issue of the      soul’s corporeity becomes important. Secondly the difficulties are      discussed which Brentano saw in the Aristotelian semi-materialistic      conception concerning the intellectual, as distinct from the sensitive      soul from Brentano’s reistic point of view which and that it is an      immaterial substance. Finally there follows a presentation of what is      taken to be Brentano’s conception of the soul as it appears from a reistic      interpretation of his analyses of the act of sensation and of the subject      of sensation in order to shed some light on the reistic ontology that may      be taken to underlie Brentanos’s psychology.”
143. ———. “Brentano’s Revision of the Correspondence Theory.”      Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung 3      (1993): 79-88.
     “Franz Brentano took exception to the classic statement of the      correspondence theory of truth, the thesis: veritas est adaequatio rei et      intellectus. His reasons for objecting to it, and his proposed revision of      the thesis, are interesting considered in themselves as well as for the      light they shed on Brentano’s view of the relation between the thinker and      the world. With regard to the former, it is shown how Brentano analyzes      the adaequatio thesis word by word in order to demonstrate what he takes      to be its fundamental incoherence. With regard to the latter, it becomes      apparent, by contrast with the Thomistic understanding of the adaequatio      thesis, that Brentano’s revision of it in the direction of a      phenomenological theory of truth also involves a revised understanding of      the nature of the thinker or knower.
144. ———. “Brentanian Unity of Consciousness.” Brentano      Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung 4 (1993):      89-100.
     “Brentano’s thoughts on unity of consciousness are of central      importance to an understanding of his psychology and of his ontology. By      means of a reistic interpretation of his views on unity of consciousness,      and in contrast with the Aristotelian approach to unity of consciousness,      one begins to see the paradoxically objective and realistic spirit of      Brentano’s subjectivism in psychology.”
145. Kraus Oskar. Franz Brentano. Zur Kenntnis Seines Lebens Uns Seiner      Lehre. Mit Beiträgen Von C. Stumpf Und E. Husserl. München: Beck, 1919.
146. ———. Franz Brentanos Stellung      Zur Phänomenologie Und Gegenstandstheorie. Leipzig:      Meiner, 1924.
147. ———. “On Categories, Relations and Fictions.” Proceedings of      the Aristotelian Society 42 (1942): 101-116.
148. Küng Guido. “Zur      Erkenntnistheorie Franz Brentano.” Grazer      Philosophische Studien 5 (1978): 169-181.
149. ———. “Brentano an Ingarden on the Experience and Cognition of      Values.” Reports on Philosophy (Jagiellonian University) 10 (1986):      57-67.
150. ———. “Brentano, Husserl Und Ingarden Über Wertende Akte Und Das      Erkennen Von Werten.” In Traditionen Und Perspektiven Der      Analytischen Philosophie. Festschrift Für Rudolf Haller, edited by      Gombocz, Wolfgang, Rutte, Heiner and Sauer, Werner. 106-117. Wien:      Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, 1989.

Selected Bibliography on Brentano’s Contributions to Logic and Ontology. Second Part: L – Z

1. Ladusaw William. “Thetic and Categorical, Stage and Individual,      Weak and Strong.” In Proceedings from Semantics and Linguistic Theory      Iv, edited by Mandy, Harvey and Santelmann, Lynn. 220-229. Ithaca: Cornell      University Press, 1994.
   “Brentano saw his task as giving a classification of cognitive acts.      He categorized such ‘thoughts’ into three main groups: presentations,      judgments, and love. By this unexpected latter term, he meant affectual      attitudes.
   The notion of ‘presentation’ in his system is both fundamental and      difficult to grasp. Its essence is the idea that a cognitive agent can      have a presentation of an object without it being the presentation of any      particular object. One can entertain presentations of objects which do not      nor could not have any real existence, like unicorns, golden mountains,      and I suppose round squares. Achieving a presentation of something is the      first step toward the other two types of acts, of which judgments concern      us most.
   Judgments (and affectual attitudes or reactions) come in contrary pairs of      affirmation and denial, the two modes of judgment. The basis for a      judgment is a simple or compound presentation, so the root of the      thetic/categorical distinction is in the definition of possible bases for      judgments.
   The basis for a thetic judgment is a presentation of an object: an entity      or eventuality. An affirmation of such a presentation commits the judger      to the existence of something which satisfies the presentation; a denial      by contrast expresses a negative existence judgment.
   The basis for a categorical judgment is compound: first a presentation      which is clarified into a particular object satisfying the description,      and then a property to be affirmed or denied of the object.
   Despite the conceptualist foundation of this system, I think we can model      it with some familiar objects. Let us equate the notion of a presentation      of an object for a description of an object. A description is something      which can be satisfied by an object. Take object to range over both      individuals and eventualities, and we have two sorts of descriptions:      descriptions of an individual and descriptions of an eventuality.      Properties we can take as basic, but crucially not as descriptions of an      individual or an eventuality. The modified ontology then is summarized in      (12):
   12. Modified Brentanan Ontology
   objects: individuals, eventualities
   descriptions of individuals and descriptions of eventualities
   properties
   The assumptions about the forms of judgment can be summarized in (13):
   13. Judgment structure
   a. Basis for a thetic judgment: a description
   b. Basis for a categorical judgment: an object and a property.
   c. A thetic judgment is an affirmation or denial of the description in the      basis. (Existential commitment)
   d. A categorical judgment is an affirmation or denial of the basis      property to the object in the basis. (Predication)
   Note that (13c) and (13d) contain a theory of negation which recognizes      both a relational and a unary notion of negative mode of judgment. The      utility of this distinction has been argued for eloquently in precisely      the same tradition by Laurence Horn The natural history of negation,      Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1989, which put me onto this line of      thinking.”
2. Land J.P.N. “Brentano’s Logical Innovations.” Mind 1 (1876):      289-292.
3. Libardi Massimo. “Franz      Brentano (1838-1917).” In The School of Franz Brentano, edited by      Albertazzi, Liliana, Libardi, Massimo and Poli, Roberto. 25-79. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1996.
4. Macnamara John. “Cognitive Psychology and the Rejection of      Brentano.” Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 23 (1993):      117-137.
5. Marocco Angelo. Brentano. Le      Prove Dell’esistenza Di Dio. Roma: Studium, 1998.
   Con una scelta di testi di Franz Brentano.
6. Marras Ausonio. “The Scholastic Roots of Brentano’s Conception of      Intentionality.” Rassegna di Scienze Filosofiche 1 (1974):      213-226.
   Reprinted in: Linda McAlister (ed.) – The philosophy of Brentano – pp.      128-139
7. Martin Wayne M. Theories of Judgment. Psychology, Logic,      Phenomenology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
8. ———. “Fichte’s Logical Legacy: Thetic Judgment from the      Wissenschaftslehre to Brentano.” In Fichte and the Phenomenological      Tradition, edited by Waibel, Violetta L., Breazeale, Daniel and Rockmore,      Tom. 379-406. Berin: de Gruyter, 2010.
   “It is not usual to think of Fichte as a logician, nor indeed to      think of him as leaving a legacy that shaped the subsequent history of      symbolic logic. But I argue here that there is such a legacy, and that      Fichte formulated an agenda in formal logic that his students (and their      students in turn) used to spark a logical revolution. That revolution      arguably reached its culmination in the logical writings of Franz      Brentano, better known as a founding figure of the phenomenological      movement. In logical writings that were published only posthumously, but      that were fully elaborated in the decade prior to the publication of      Frege’s Begriffschrift, Brentano (together with his collaborator Anton      Marty) developed a radically innovative logical calculus that was      explicitly designed to overthrow the orthodox logical analysis of judgment      and inference. At the center of this revolution was the notion of thetic      judgment [thetische Urteil], a form of judgment upon which Fichte had      insisted in the first published version of the Wissenschaftslehre, and      which his students subsequently set out to accommodate within the      framework provided by Kant’s general logic. But thetic
   judgment proved resistant to such assimilation, and it was left to      Brentano to use the analysis of thetic judgment in his attempt to topple a      long-standing logical tradition.
   In what follows I reconstruct the main episodes in this century-long drama      in the logical theory of judgment. My discussion is divided into four      sections. I begin with a review of Fichte’s most explicit call for logical      revolution, together with his introduction of the notion of thetic      judgment, set against the backdrop of an anomaly within Kant’s logical      commitments. In the second section I trace the logical treatment of this      anomaly among Fichte’s philosophical progeny, in particular Johann      Friedrich Herbart and Moritz Drobisch. The third section explores      Brentano’s position, and his more radical solution to the anomaly      bequeathed by Kant. In the final section I return to Fichte, to consider      to what degree these subsequent developments remained faithful to the      logical agenda Fichte had projected.”
9. Mayer-Hillebrand Franziska. “Franz Brentanos Wissenschaftlicher      Nachlass.” Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 6 (1952):      599-603.
10. ———. “Remarks Concerning the Interpretation of the Philosophy of      Franz Brentano: A Reply to Dr. Srzednicki.” Philosophy and      Phenomenological Research 23 (1963): 438-444.
11. ———. “Franz Brentano Einfluss Auf Die Philosophie Seiner Zeit Und      Der Gegenwart.” Revue Internationale de Philosophie 20 (1966):      373-394.
12. Mazzù Antonino.      “Psychologie Empirique Et Psychologie Métaphysique Chez F.      Brentano.” Annales de Phénomenologie 3      (2004): 17-57.
13. ———. “La Question Du      Rapport Intentionnel Chez F. Brentano.” In      Questions Sur L’intentionnalité, edited by Couloubaritsis, Lambros and      Mazzù, Antonino. 233-254. Bruxelles: Ousia, 2007.
14. McAlister Linda Lopez. “Franz Brentano and Intentional      Inexistence.” Journal of History of Philosophy 8 (1970): 423-430.
15. ———. “Chisholm and Brentano on Intentionality.” Review of Metaphysics      28 (1975): 328-338.
    Reprinted in: Linda McAlister (ed.) – The philosophy of Brentano – pp.      151-159
16. ———, ed. The Philosophy of Brentano. London: Duckworth, 1976.
    Contents: Editor’s Introduction VII-IX; Oskar Kraus: Biographical sketch      of Franz Brentano 1; Carl Stumpf: Reminiscences of Franz Brentano 10;      Edmund Husserl: Reminiscences of Franz Brentano 47; Étienne Gilson:      Brentano’s interpretation of medieval philosophy 56; Lucie Gilson: Franz      Brentano on science and philosophy 68; E. B. Titchener: Brentano and      Wundt: empirical and experimental psychology 80; Roderick Chisholm:      Brentano’s descriptive psychology 91; Thomas De Boer: The descriptive      method of Franz Brentano: its two functions and their significance for      phenomenology 101; Herbert Spiegelberg: Intention and intentionality in      the Scholastics, Brentano and Husserl 108; Ausonio Marras: Scholastic      roots of Brentano’s conception of intentionality 128; Roderick Chisholm:      Intentional inexistence 140; Linda McAlister: Chisholm and Brentano on intentionality      151; Roderick Chisholm: Brentano’s theory of correct and incorrect emotion      160; George Edward Moore: Review of Franz Brentano’s The Origin of the      Knowledge of Right and Wrong 176; Gabriel Franks: Was G. E. Moore mistaken      about Brentano? 182; Tadeusz Kotarbinski: Franz Brentano as Reist 194; D.      B. Terrell: Brentano’s argument for Reismus 204; Hugo Bergmann: Brentano’s      theory of induction 213; Oskar Kraus: Toward a phenomenognosy of time      consciousness 224; Bibliography of the published writings of Brentano:      240; Bibliography of works on Brentano: 248; Index of names 255; General      Index 259-262.
17. ———. The Development of Franz Brentano’s Ethics. Amsterdam: Rodopi,      1982.
18. McCormick Peter. “Sur Le Développement Du Concept De      L’intentionnalité Chez Brentano Et Husserl.” Philosophiques 8 (1981):      227-237.
19. Melandri Enzo. “The ‘Analogia Entis’ According to Franz Brentano:      A Speculative-Grammatical Analysis of Aristotle’s ‘Metaphysics’.”      Topoi 6 (1987): 51-58.
20. Melle Ullrich. “Zu Brentanos Und Husserls Ethikansatz: Die      Analogie Zwischen Den Vernunftarten.” Brentano      Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung 1 (1988):      109-120.
21. Mezei Balasz, and Smith Barry. The Four Phases of Philosophy.      Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1998.
22. Mezei Balasz. “Brentano and Husserl on the History of      Philosophy.” Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz      Brentano Forschung 8 (2000): 81-94.
    “A particular subject-matter in Franz Brentano’s philosophy is his      approach to the history of philosophy. I shall consider the evolution of      his concept of the history of philosophy, the sources of this concept,      and, finally, its relationship to Edmund Husserl’s understanding of the      history of philosophy. Brentano’s scheme of the four phases of the history      of philosophy can serve as a principle of evaluation of what comes after      Brentano’s era in the history of philosophy.”
23. Modenato Francesca. Coscienza      Ed Essere in Franz Brentano. Bologna: Patron, 1979.
24. Mohanty Jitendra Nath. The Concept of Intentionality. St. Louis:      Warren H. Green, 1972.
25. Moore George Edward. “The Origin of the Knowledge of Right and      Wrong.” International Journal of Ethics 14 (1903): 115-123.
    Reprinted in: Linda McAlister (ed.), The philosophy of Brentano, pp.      176-181.
26. Moran Dermot. “Brentano’s Thesis.” Proceedings of the      Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes 70 (1996): 1-27.
27. ———. “Heidegger’s Critique of Husserl’s and Brentano’s Accounts      of Intentionality.” Inquiry 43 (2000): 39-65.
    “Inspired by Aristotle, Franz Brentano revived the concept of      intentionality to characterize the domain of mental phenomena studied by      descriptive psychology. Edmund Husserl, while discarding much of      Brentano’s conceptual framework and presuppositions, located      intentionality at the core of his science of pure consciousness (phenomenology).      Martin Heidegger, Husserl’s assistant from 1919 to 1923, dropped all      reference to intentionality and consciousness in Being and Time (1927),      and so appeared to break sharply with his avowed mentors, Brentano and      Husserl. Some recent commentators have sided with Heidegger and have      endorsed his critique of Husserl and Brentano as still caught up in      epistemological, representationalist approaches to intentionality. I argue      that Heidegger is developing Husserl, focusing in particular on the      ontological dimension of intentionality, not reversing or abandoning his      account. Heidegger’s criticisms of representationalism merely repeat      Husserl’s. Furthermore, I argue that Husserl’s account of cognitive      intentionality, which recognizes the importance of the disinterested      theoretical attitude for scientific knowledge, has been underestimated and      misunderstood by Heidegger, who treats scientific cognition as a deficient      form of practice. In short, Heidegger is more dependent on Husserl than he      ever publicly acknowledged.”
28. ———. “Franz Brentano: Descriptive Psychology and      Intentionality.” In Introduction to Phenomenology. 23-59. New York:      Roultdge, 2000.
29. Morrison James C. “Husserl and Brentano on Intentionality.”      Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 31 (1971): 27-46.
30. Morscher Edgar. “Brentano and His Place in Austrian      Philosophy.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 5 (1978): 1-10.
    “The first part of this paper summarizes what I take to be the most      important doctrines of Brentano’s philosophy. The second part investigates      the possible meanings of the term ‘Austrian philosophy’. The third part      attempts to say something about Brentano’s place in Austrian philosophy —      whatever that may be –, while the fourth part focuses on a problem in      which I am especially interested. The paper closes with a proposal for      what the expression ‘Austrian philosophy’ could mean.”
31. Mulligan Kevin, and Smith Barry. “Franz Brentano on the Ontology      of Mind.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 45 (1985):      627-644.
32. Mulligan Kevin. “Judgings: Their Parts and Counterparts.”      Topoi Supplement 2 (1988): 117-148.
33. ———. “Sur L’histoire De      L’approche Analytique De L’histoire De La Philosophie: De Bolzano Et      Brentano À Bennett Et Barnes.” In Philosophie Analytique Et      Histoire De La Philosophie, edited by Vienne, Jean-Michel. 61-103. Paris:      Vrin, 1997.
34. Münch Dieter. “Brentanos Lehre Von Der Intentionalen      Inexistenz.” In Von Bolzano Zu Wittgenstein. Zur Tradition Der      Österreichischen Philosophie, edited by Nyiri, Janós. 119-127. Wien:      Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, 1986.
35. ———. “Brentano and Comte.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 36      (1989): 33-54.
36. ———. Intention Und Zeichen. Untersuchungen Zu Franz Brentano Und Zu      Edmund Husserls Frühwerk. Frankfurt a. Main: Suhrkamp, 1993.
37. ———. “Die Einheit Von Geist Und Leib: Brentanos      Habilitationsschrift Über Die Psychologie Des Aristoteles Als Antwort Auf      Zeller.” Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano      Forschung 6 (1996): 125-144.
38. ———. “Neues Zum Frühen Brentano.” Grazer Philosophische      Studien 67 (2004): 209-225.
39. ———. “Franz Brentano Et La      Réception Catholique D’aristote Au Xix Siècle.” In      Aristote Au Xix Siècle, edited by Thouard, Denis. 231-248. Villeneuve      d’Asq Cédex: Presses Universitaires du Septentrion, 2004.
40. Orth Ernst-Wolfgang. “Metaphysische Implikationen Der      Intentionalität: Trendelenburg, Lotze, Brentano.” Brentano      Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung 7 (1997):      15-30.
41. Parsons Charles. “Brentano on Judgement and Truth.” In The      Cambridge Companion to Brentano, edited by Jacquette, Dale. 168-196.      Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
42. Pasquerella Lynn. “Intensional Logic and Brentano’s      Non-Propositional Theory of Judgement.” Grazer Philosophische Studien      29 (1987): 117-119.
43. ———. “Brentano and the Direct Attribution Theory.” Brentano      Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung 1 (1988):      189-197.
    “According to Brentano, what is characteristic of every mental act is      the reference to something as an object. The exact nature of an object of      our mental acts has, however, been first the subject of steady discussion      in Brentano’s writings and consecutively gave rise to controversy for      contemporary philosophers of mind; e.g. Chisholm, Castañeda. What follows      is an elucidation of the relationship between Brentano’s final theory of      sensation and its interpretation in Chisholm’s Direct Attribution theory      as a consideration of a recent challenge by Castañeda: that while the      Brentanian-Chisholmian account is exemplary in dealing with tacit      self-reference at the level of unreflective consciousness, this theory      needs to be developed even further to be adequate to those cases of      self-reference involved in reflective consciousness.”
44. ———. “Kotarbinski and Brentano on Truth.” Topoi Supplement 4      (1989): 98-106.
45. ———. “Brentano and Aesthetic Intentions.” Brentano      Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung 4 (1993):      235-249.
    “Brentano’s philosophy of art, contained primarily in his book,      Grundzuge der Ästhetik, is the result of an original theory of intrinsic      value that was derived from Brentano’s philosophical psychology. In his      aesthetics, Brentano endeavored to find an objective ground for the value      of aesthetic contemplation through his theory of the intentional objects      of emotions and desires. The lack of attention Brentano’s aesthetics has      received is surprising, given that two of the many students Brentano      influenced, Husserl (through the development of the phenomenological      movement) and Ehrenfels (through the development of Gestalt psychology)      have had an extraordinary influence on twentieth century perceptions of      art. In this paper I will attempt to redress some of this neglect by      outlining Brentano’s analysis of aesthetic intentions and the relationship      his aesthetics bears to his overall philosophical system.”
46. ———. “Intentionality, Phenomenology and Sensation in      Brentano.” Southern Journal of Philosophy 40 (Supplement) (2002):      269-279.
47. Pavlik Jan. “Brentano’s Theory of Intentionality.” Brentano      Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung 3 (1991):      63-70.
    “Brentano’s intentional psychology is an attempt at overcoming the      Humean tradition characterized by probabilistic empirism, subjectivism and      psychologism. Intentional psychology enables restoration of the autonomy      of human psyche with reference to natural laws as well as overcoming the      reduction of specific subject-object relations to object-object relations      realized in associationist psychology. In contrast with speculative      approaches of German classical philosophy, Brentano’s theory enables      empirical, non-metaphysical inquiry of subject-object relations.”
48. Pietersma Henry. “Brentano’s Concept of the Evident.”      Analecta Husserliana 7 (1978): 235-244.
49. Poli Roberto. “Towards a Non-Symbolic Semantics.” Brentano      Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung 4 (1993):      221-234.
    “Starting from some ideas proposed by Suszko, Brentano’s      non-propositional theory of judgement is considered. In order to clarify      (some of) the formal and ontological aspects of his theory, the      distinction between external (symbolic) and internal (non-symbolic)      semantics is introduced and discussed.”
50. ———. “Ontologia E Logica      in Franz Brentano: Giudizi Categorici E Giudizi Tetici.” Epistemologia 16 (1993): 39-76.
    “The various attempts to clarify and interpret Brentano’s logical      analysis have merely provided a paraphrase of Brentano own words. We will      analyse Brentano’s proposals against the background of traditional logic.      In his Formale Logik, Bochenski explicitly warns us that logic not only      “does not give proof of a linear continuity of evolution”, but      that the logic which follows a long period of decadence “departs, for      the most part, from different presuppositions and points of view, uses a      different technique, and develops previously neglected aspects of the      problematic. It is a different form of logic”. I shall bear these      remarks of Bochenski’s carefully in mind and I shall argue that      mathematically-based modern formal logic and syllogistic theory of the      past exemplify two distinct formal paradigms. My reference to two      different paradigms, and not just to two different calculuses, implies      that most of the syllogistic reformulations of this century are, broadly      speaking, suspect; and specifically because they take the syllogistic to      be a part or a fragment of first-order predicative calculus. Careful study      of traditional logic immediately shows that traditional logic expresses      specific ontological perspectives which are deeply embedded in its formal      structures. From this point of view, Brentano’s theory is a brilliant      attempt to escape from some of the most difficult impasses of traditional      logic and offers tools for new developments. Unfortunately, it arrived too      late, just as the Fregean paradigm was about to burst on the scene.”
51. ———. “Kotarbinski, Ajdukiewicz, Brentano: The Dispute About      Reism.” In Polish Scientific Philosophy. The Lvov-Warsaw School,      edited by Coniglione, Franco, Poli, Roberto and Wolenski, Jan. 339-354.      Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1993.
52. ———. “The Dispute over Reism: Kotarbinski – Ajdukiewicz – Brentano.”      In Polish Scientific Philosophy. The Lwow-Warsaw School, edited by      Coniglione, Franco, Poli, Roberto and Wolenski, Jan. 339-354. Amsterdam:      Rodopi, 1993.
53. ———. “At the Origins of Analytic Philosophy.” Aletheia 6      (1994): 218-231.
54. ———, ed. The Brentano Puzzle. Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998.
    Contents: List of Contributors VII; Roberto Poli: Foreword IX-X; Roberto      Poli: The Brentano puzzle: an introduction 1; Dallas Willard: Who needs      Brentano? The wasteland of philosophy without its past 15; Claire Ortiz      Hill: Introduction to Paul Linke’s ‘Gottlob Frege as philosopher’ 45; Paul      F. Linke: Gottlob Frege as philosopher 49; John Blackmore: Franz Brentano      and the University of Vienna Philosophical Society 1888-1938 73; Alf      Zimmer: On agents and objects: some remarks on Brentanian perception 93;      Liliana Albertazzi: Perceptual saliences and nuclei of meaning 113; Jan      Srzednicki: Brentano and the thinkable 139; Claire Ortiz Hill: From      empirical psychology to phenomenology. Edmund Husserl on the ‘Brentano      puzzle’ 151; Serena Cattaruzza: Brentano and Boltzmann: the      Schubladenexperiment 169; Karl Schuhmann: Johannes Daubert’s theory of      judgement 179; Evelyn Dölling: On Alexius Meinong’s theory of signs 199;      Robin Rollinger: Linguistic expressions and acts of meaning: comments on      Marty’s philosophy of language 215-225.
    “The papers collected in this volume arise from the conference      “The Brentano Puzzle,” organized in Bolzano / Bozen, Italy, on      the 14th and 15th of November 1996 by the Central European Institute of      Culture.
    The conference’s aim was to analyse the following puzzle. Even if the      width and the depth of Brentano’s intellectual legacy are now well known,      those asked to list the principal philosophers of the nineteenth century      very rarely mention his name. We may call this puzzle the problem of      Brentano’s ‘invisibility.’
    It is obvious that Brentano’s invisibility has serious consequences on      assessment of his philosophical theory. The reconstruction of Brentano’s      thought is still flawed and incomplete. Moreover, Brentano’s emphasis on      oral teaching, and the meagreness of his published work, compared with the      enormous quantity of his manuscripts and correspondence, are also of      theoretical importance because they are rooted in Brentano’s method of      ‘doing’ philosophy. We know that the distinguishing feature of his      philosophy was its empirical bias, its insistence on rigorous and partial      answers rather than on the construction of systems. Given these features,      it comes as no surprise that the same problem should be examined on      several separate occasions and that different solutions should be proposed      for it.
    This procedure has a certain amount of inner coherence. Although Brentano      always began his analysis with specific topics and problems, he proposed      solutions which then reverberated through the entire edifice of his      philosophy. This is a manner of philosophising which takes the natural      sciences as its model. These factors also account for the different      solutions that Brentano proposed for the problems he addressed. His thought,      in fact, displays a continuity of method and a permanence of problems, but      not a univocity of solutions. It is this aspect that allows one to talk of      a school of Brentano among his pupils, to detect a ‘family resemblance’      among philosophers and scholars belonging to different disciplines. That      is to say, the school is defined more by problems and the method used in      their analysis than by their solutions in the strict sense. Accordingly,      his heterodox followers, such as Carl Stumpf, Anton Marty, Alexius Meinong,      Christian von Ehrenfels, Edmund Husserl and Kazimierz Twardowski, were      more faithful to their master’s thought than the orthodox Brentanians like      Oskar Kraus, Alfred Kastil and Franziska Mayer-Hillebrand.
    One further component of the Brentano puzzle is that a number of      Brentano’s outstanding pupils achieved their own success and founded their      own schools. Suffice it to mention Husserl’s phenomenology, Twardowski’s      Lvov-Warsaw school and Meinong’s Graz school. The personal success and      academic recognition attained by these exponents of Brentano’s school (in      the broad sense) have come to obscure their common thematic origins. The      sub–)`;Ýësequent split between analytic philosophy and phenomenology      generated, as a side-effect, the oblivion into which Franz Brentano’s      thought then fell.
    Nevertheless, Brentano and his school display surprising affinities with      Frege and the tradition that he inspired. Perhaps the most interesting      reconstruction of these connections is that accomplished by a number of      works in German by Paul Linke. It was thought that a survey of Linke’s      thought might prove useful to English readers. For this reason the book      also contains the English translation of his ‘Gottlob Frege als      Philosoph,’ published in 1947, with an introduction by Claire Ortiz Hill.
    Last but not least, analyses of the relevance of Brentano’s and his      followers’ theses for contemporary philosophical and scientific debate are      also considered.” (Foreword by Roberto Poli)
55. ———. “Brentano in Italy.” Brentano Studien.Internationales      Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung 8 (2000): 233-257.
56. ———. “Approaching Brentano’s Theory of Categories.” In      Phenomenology and Analysis. Essays on Central European Philosophy, edited      by Chrudzimski, Arkadiusz and Huemer, Wolfgang. 285-322. Frankfurt: Ontos      Verlag, 2004.
57. Potrc Matjaz. “Grades of Intentionality.” Brentano      Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung 3 (1993):      71-78.
    “Intentional inexistence is to be understood via directedness to an      internal object which may but needs not exist. As far as the relation to      the object exists, it is infallible – contrary to the fallible      directedness at an external object. Brentanian intentionality is based on      the evidence, and does not allow for degrees. Brentano has been careful to      delimit his project of “Psychognosie” from the physical and from      the physiological. The thesis of intentional gradation is discussed, which      allows for three degrees. The first form of intentionality involves simple      tropisms. The second grade of intentionality is the one of generality, as      opposed to specificity and particularity. The third intentional grade      would enable directedness to the singular.
    As human organisms only are able to entertain directedness to the      singular, brentanian intentionality would fall under the second kind of      directedness, the one involving generality. Supposition that this thesis      is right might then lead to the question whether Brentano really described      intentionality specific for human organisms.”
58. Prechtl Peter. “Die Struktur Der Intentionalität Bei Brentano Und      Husserl.” Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz      Brentano Forschung 2 (1989): 117-130.
59. Rancurello Antos. A Study of Franz Brentano. His Psychological      Standpoint and His Significance in the History of Psychology. New York:      Academic Press, 1968.
60. Richardson Robert. “Brentano on Intentional Inexistence and the      Distinction between Mental and Physical Phenomena.” Archiv für      Geschichte der Philosophie 65 (1983): 250-282.
61. Rojszczack Artur. “Wharheit Und Urteilsevidenz Bei Franz      Brentano.” Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz      Brentano Forschung 5 (1994): 187-218.
62. ———. From the Act of Judging to the Sentence. The Problem of Truth      Bearers from Bolzano to Tarski. Dordrecht: Springer, 2005.
    Edited by Jan Wolenski
63. Rollinger Robin D. “Husserl and Brentano on Imagination.”      Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 75 (1993): 195-210.
    Reprinted with the title: Brentano and Husserl on Imagination in: R. D.      Rollinger, Austrian Phenomenology. Brentano, Husserl, Meinong, and Others      on Mind and Object, Frankfurt, Ontos Verlag, 2009, pp. 29-50.
64. ———. Husserl’s Position in the School of Brentano. Dordrecht: Kluwer,      1999.
65. ———. “Austrian Theories of Judgment: Bolzano, Brentano, Meinong,      and Husserl.” In Phenomenology and Analysis. Essays on Central      European Philosophy, edited by Chrudzimski, Arkadiusz and Huemer,      Wolfgang. 257-284. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag, 2004.
    Reprinted in: R. D. Rollinger, Austrian Phenomenology. Brentano, Husserl,      Meinong, and Others on Mind and Object, Frankfurt, Ontos Verlag, 2009, pp.      233-262.
66. ———. “Meinong and Brentano.” Meinong Studies / Meinong      Studien 1 (2005): 159-198.
    “Meinong, like other noteworthy philosophers from central Europe,      began his career in philosophy under the guidance of Franz Brentano. Though      Meinong’s philosophical investigations from early on were very Brentanian      in character, he came to develop views that diverged from certain      doctrines of his mentor. In epistemology Meinong introduced the notion of      immediate evidence of surmise in his views on memory and perception,      whereas Brentano found this notion unacceptable. In descriptive psychology      Meinong regarded feelings and desires as two distinct classes and      introduced an additional class of mental phenomena called      “assumptions”. Thus he opposed Brentano’s classification of      mental phenomena into presentations, judgments, and acts of love and hate.      In ontology Meinong allowed for non-real objects. In value theory he even      introduced the notion of special irrealia corresponding to feelings and      desires. Brentano, however, came to reject irrealia altogether. Such      differences are discussed here, but attention is also given to the      underlying and enduring philosophical affinity between Meinong and      Brentano, namely their commitment to the ideal of scientific philosophy as      attainable through descriptive psychology (what might be called      “descriptive phenomenology”), which is concerned with      intentionally directed consciousness as its subject matter and does not in      any way differ methodologically from natural science.”
67. ———. “Brentano’s Logic and Marty’s Early Philosophy of      Language.” Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz      Brentano Forschung 12 (2006): 77-98.
68. ———. “Brentano’s Psychology and Logic and the Basis of      Twardowski’s Theory of Presentations.” The Baltic International      Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication (2009): 1-23.
69. Rossi Guido. Giudizio E      Raziocinio. Studi Sulla Logica Dei Brentaniani. Milano:      Sodalitas, 1926.
70. Rothenberg Beno. “Studien Zur Logik Franz Brentano’s.” 1962.
    Inaugural Dissertation. University Frankfurt am Main.
71. Runggaldier Edmund. “On the Scholastic or Aristotelian Roots of      ‘Intentionality’ in Brentano.” Topoi 8 (1989): 97-103.
    “The early Brentano identifies intentionality with “intentional      inexistence”, i.e., with a kind of indwelling of the intentional      object in the mind. The latter concept cannot be grasped apart from its      scholastic background and the Aristotelian-Thomistic doctrine of the      multiple use of Being (to on legetai pollachos). The fact that Brentano abandoned      the theory of the intentional inexistence in the course of time does not      contradict the thesis that it is intentional inexistence and not the      modern conception of reference or directedness to something other which      comprises the essence of intentionality for the early Brentano.”
72. Russo Antonio. “Franz      Brentano E Heinrich Denifle: Un Carteggio Inedito.” Studium (2003): 333-356.
73. ———. La Scuola Cattolica Di      Franz Brentano: Heinrich Suso Denifle. Trieste: EUT, 2003.
    Con un carteggio inedito F. Brentano – H. Denifle.
74. Sanford David. “Chisholm on Brentano’s Thesis.” In The      Philosophy of Roderick M. Chisholm, edited by Hahn, Lewis. Chicago:      Open-Court Publishing Co., 1997.
75. Sauer Werner. “Erneuerung Der Philosophia Perennis: Über Die      Ersten Vier Habilitationsthesen Brentanos.” Grazer Philosophische      Studien 58/59 (2000): 119-150.
76. ———. “Die Einheit Der Intentionalitätskonzeption Bei      Brentano.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 73 (2006): 1-26.
    “The objective of this paper is to refute the widely held view that      in the wake of his so-called reistic turn Brentano subjected his notion of      intentionality to a deep-going revision, viz., that he turned from an      ontological account of the intentional object by way of identifying it      with the thought-of-thing, i.e., the intentional correlate, or by way of      attributing to it a peculiar sort of existence, to a non-ontological      account thereof. It will be shown that neither the pre-reistic Brentano      espoused anything of an ontological account of the intentional object in that      he both distinguished it sharply from the intentional correlate and      definitely rejected the idea of there being different sorts of existence,      and it will be argued that the apparently ineradicable inclination to      ascribe to the pre-reistic Brentano an ontological account of the      intentional object stems from ignoring the Aristotelian background of      Brentano’s thinking about relations.”
77. Schaar Maria van der. “Evidence and the Law of Excluded Middle:      Brentano on Truth.” In The Logica Yearbook 1998. 110-120. Prague:      Filosofia, 1999.
78. ———. “Brentano on Logic, Truth and Evidence.” Brentano      Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung 10 (2003):      119-150.
    “In this paper it will be argued that Brentano’s later writings about      this topic can be understood better if one describes it as a result partly      of his immanent development and partly of Brentano’s reactions to his      contemporaries.”
79. Schmit Roger. “Allgemeinheit Und Existenz. Zur Analyse Der      Kategorischen Urteils Bei Herbart, Sigwart, Brentano Und Frege.”      Grazer Philosophische Studien 23 (1985): 58-78.
80. Schuhmann Karl. “Die Einwirkung Brentanos Auf Die Mûnchener      Phänomenologen.” Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz      Brentano Forschung 1 (1988): 97-107.
81. ———. “Der Gegenstandsbegriff in Brentanos ‘Psychognosie’.”      Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung 5      (1994): 167-176.
82. Sebestik Jan. “Bolzano Et Brentano. Deux Sources Autrichiennes Du      Cercle De Vienne.” Fundamenta Scientiae 5 (1984): 219-235.
83. Simons Peter M. “A Brentanian Basis for Lesniewskian Logic.”      Logiquet et Analyse 27 (1984): 297-307.
    Reprinted in: Peter Simons – Philosophy and logic in Central Europe from      Bolzano to Tarski. Selected essays – Dodrecht, Kluwer 1992 pp. 259-269.
84. ———. “Brentano’s Reform of Logic.” Topoi 6 (1986): 25-38.
    Reprinted in: Peter Simons – Philosophy and logic in Central Europe from      Bolzano to Tarski. Selected essays – Dodrecht, Kluwer 1992 pp. 41-69
85. ———. “Brentano’s Theory of Categories: A Critical      Reappraisal.” Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz      Brentano Forschung 1 (1988): 47-61.
    “In his doctoral dissertation Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des      Seienden nach Aristoteles Brentano tried to show that (against criticism      of this) one could indeed give a principle defense of Aristotle’s table of      categories as a coherent system. In later texts Brentano appears sharply      critical of Aristotle, mainly in respect to Aristotle’s mereology, or      theory of part and whole, and to his theory of substance and accident.
    It is argued that Brentano hadn’t observed that Aristotle’s belief that      there are as many predicative senses of ‘be’ as there are categories of      being is based not on his mereology but on his theory of definition.      Overlooking this Brentano was led to far reaching inadequate ontological      consequences.”
86. Simons Peter M., and Wolenski Jan. “De Veritate: Austro-Polish      Contributions to the Theory of Truth from Brentano to Tarski.” In The      Vienna Circle and the Lvov-Warsaw School, edited by Szaniawski, Klemens.      391-442. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1989.
87. Simons Peter M. “Bolzano, Brentano and Meinong: Three Austrian      Realists.” In German Philosophy since Kant, edited by O’Hear,      Anthony. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
    “Although Brentano generally regarded himself as at heart a metaphysician,      his work then and subsequently has always been dominated by the      Psychology. He is rightly celebrated as the person who reintroduced the      Aristotelian-Scholastic notion of intentio back into the study of the      mind. Brentano’s inspiration was Aristotle’s theory of perception in De      anima, though his terminology of intentional inexistence was medieval. For      the history of the work and its position in his output may I refer to my      Introduction to the reprinted English translation. Alongside Aristotle the      work shows influences of Descartes, Comte and the British empiricists. The      theory of intentionality presented in the Psychology is much less modern      and less plausible than almost all recent commentary would have it, and      was in any case not where Brentano’s main interest lay. Intentionality      simply served to demarcate mental phenomena from physical, in Book One,      but the main aim was a classification of the mental, outlined in Book Two.      Books Three to Five were to have dealt in detail with the three main classes      of presentations, judgements and feelings, with the final book considering      the metaphysics: mind-body and the immortality of the soul. Brentano’s      shifting views, recently documented in English with Benito Muller’s      translation of Descriptive Psychology, a work from the transitional 1890s,      made the original plan obsolete. The role of an a priori, philosophical or      descriptive psychology, methodologically prior to empirical-experimental      genetic psychology, foreshadowed and influenced Husserl’s notion of phenomenology,      and Brentano’s Comtean methodological epoche of desisting from      controversial metaphysical statements in favour of an examination of the      phenomena likewise presaged Husserl’s more ponderous phenomenological      reductions.
    Brentano’s other work covers most areas of philosophy, notably ethics,      where he upheld a form of a priori intuitionism much admired by G. E.      Moore, the philosophy of religion, metaphysics, philosophy of language,      deductive and inductive logic, and the history of philosophy. I shall mention      just two areas. In his logic lectures from 1866 onwards (a compilation      published 1956) Brentano rejected the subject-predicate analysis of simple      judgements and proposed instead (for which he apparently secured written      assent from Mill) that all judgements are logical compounds of positive      and negative existential judgements. For example the universal judgement      All men are mortal becomes the negative existential There are no immortal      men. On this basis Brentano radically simplified the inference rules of      deductive logic. While unlike de Morgan, Frege and others he does not go      beyond logic’s traditional scope by recognising relations, within its      bounds his reformed-term logic is simple, elegant and easily teachable.      Some of his ideas in logic influenced the young Husserl. Unfortunately      Brentano took against mathematical logic, which he wrongly associated      exclusively with Hamilton’s confused doctrine of the quantification of the      predicate. His inductive logic, which takes up by far the greater part of his      logic lectures, remains unresearched to this day.” (pp. 118-119)
88. ———. “The Four Phases of Philosophy: Brentano’s Theory and      Austria’s History.” Monist 83 (2000): 68-88.
89. ———. “Judging Correctly: Brentano and the Reform of Elementary      Logic.” In The Cambridge Companion to Brentano, edited by Jacquette,      Dale. 45-65. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
90. Smith Barry. “Kafka and Brentano: A Study in Descriptive      Psychology.” In Structure and Gestalt: Philosophy and Literature in      Austria-Hungary and Her Successor States, edited by Smith, Barry. 113-160.      Amsterdam: Benjamins, 1981.
91. ———. “The Substance of Brentano’s Ontology.” Topoi 6 (1987):      39-49.
92. ———. “The Soul and Its Parts. A Study in Aristotle and      Brentano.” Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz      Brentano Forschung 1 (1988): 75-88.
    “The attempt is made to show that the key for a correct      interpretation of Brentano’s writings can be derived from an examination      of his very early dissertations. The overarching context of all Brentano’s      writings is the psychology of Aristotle and the ontology of material and      immaterial substance that goes together therewith. The present remarks      will accordingly consist in an account of Aristotle, and more specifically      of Aristotle’s conception of the soul, as reflected by Brentano in his      Psychology of Aristotle, Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint and      Descriptive Psychology.”
93. ———. “The Primacy of Place: An Investigation in Brentanian      Ontology.” Topoi 8 (1989): 43-51.
94. ———. “On the Phases of Reism.” In Kotarbinski: Logic,      Semantics and Ontology, edited by Wolenski, Jan. 137-184. Dordrecht:      Kluwer, 1990.
95. ———. “The Soul and Its Parts Ii: Varieties of Inexistence.”      Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung 4      (1993): 35-52.
    “A Brentanian might criticize contemporary philosophy of mind on at      least the following counts:
    i. its taxonomy of types of mental act and state is too narrow (thus its      repertoire consists, on many standard accounts, in little more than      ‘beliefs’ and `desires’);
    ii. its treatment of mental acts and states is too slavishly oriented      around linguistic factors (thus for example it is standardly suggested      that the philosophy of mind is most properly concerned with the so-called      ‘propositional attitudes’);
    iii. its treatment of the temporal structures of mental acts and states is      overly crude (thus in many standard accounts punctual and episodic acts      are not distinguished from enduring states and dispositions);
    iv. it presupposes an over-crude theory of the internal structures of      mental acts and states and of the corresponding types of parts and unity.
    It is with this last that we shall be principally concerned in what      follows, and more precisely with Brentano’s own account of the part-whole      structures obtaining in the mental sphere.”
96. ———. Austrian Philosophy. The Legacy of Franz Brentano. Chicago: Open      Court, 1994.
97. ———. “Boundaries: A Brentanian Theory.” Brentano      Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung 8 (2000):      107-114.
    “According to Brentano’s theory of boundaries, no boundary can exist      without being connected with a continuum. But there is no specifiable part      of the continuum, and no point, which is such that we may say that it is      the existence of that part or of that point which conditions the boundary.      – An adequate theory of the continuum must now recognize that boundaries      be boundaries only in certain directions and not in others. This leads to      consequences in other areas, too.”
98. Sorabji Richard. “From Aristotle to Brentano: The Development of      the Concept of Intentionality.” Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy      Supplementary volume (1991): 227-259.
99. Spiegelberg Herbert. “Der Begriff Der Intentionalität in Der      Scholastik Bei Brentano Und Bei Husserl.” Philosophische Hefte 5      (1936): 75-91.
    Revised by the author and translated in: Linda McAlister (ed.) – The      philosophy of Brentano – pp. 108-127
100. ———. The Phenomenological Movement. A Historical Introduction. The      Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960.
     Second revised edition 1978; Third expanded edition with the collaboration      of Karl Schuhmann 1982.
     Chapter I. Franz Brentano (1838-1917) forerunner of the phenomenological      movement – pp. 27-50.

     “Brentano’s first concern in psychology was to find a characteristic      which separates psychological from non-psychological or ‘physical’      phenomena. It was in connection with this attempt that he first developed      his celebrated doctrine of intentionality as the decisive constituent of      psychological phenomena. The sentence in which he introduces the term      ‘intentionality’ is of such crucial importance that I shall render it here      in literal translation: Every psychical phenomenon is characterized by      what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional (or      sometimes the mental) inexistence of an object, and what we should like to      call, although not quite unambiguously, the reference (Beziehung) to a      content, the directedness (Richtung) toward an object (which in this      context is not to be understood as something real) or the immanent-object      quality (immanente Gegenständlichkeit). Each contains something as its      object, though not each in the same manner. In the representation      (Vorstellung) something is represented, in the judgment something is      acknowledged or rejected, in desiring it is desired, etc. This intentional      inexistence is peculiar alone to psychical phenomena. No physical      phenomenon shows anything like it. And thus we can define psychical      phenomena by saying that they are such phenomena as contain objects in      themselves by way of intention (intentional). (1)Actually, this first      characterization of the psychological phenomenon makes use of two phrases:      ‘intentional inexistence’ and ‘reference to a content.’ It is the first of      these phrases which has attracted most attention, and it has even given      rise to the view, supported by both anti-scholastics and neo-scholastic      critics, that this whole doctrine was nothing but a loan from medieval      philosophy. While a quick reading of the passage may seem to confirm this      view, it is nevertheless misleading. ‘Intentional inexistence,’ which      literally implies the existence of an ‘intentio’ inside the intending      being, as if imbedded in it, is indeed a Thomistic conception. But it is      precisely this conception which Brentano himself did not share, or which      in any case he abandoned, to the extent of finally even dropping the very      term ‘intentionality.’ Thus, the second characterization of the psychic      phenomenon, ‘reference to an object,’ is the more important and the only      permanent one for Brentano; it is also the one listed exclusively in the      Table of Contents, beginning with the first edition. What is more: as far      as I can make out, this characterization is completely original with      Brentano, except for whatever credit he himself generously extends to      Aristotle for its ‘first germs’ in a rather minor passage of the      Metaphysics (1021 a 29). It was certainly none of Brentano’s doing that      this new wholly unscholastic conception came to sail under the old flag of      ‘intentionality.’ Reference to an object is thus the decisive and      indispensable feature of anything that we consider psychical: No hearing      without something heard, no believing without something believed, no      hoping without something hoped, no striving without something striven for,      no joy without something we feel joyous about, etc. Physical phenomena are      characterized, by contrast, as lacking such references. It also becomes      clear at this point that Brentano’s psychological phenomena are always      acts, taking this term in a very broad sense which comprises experiences      of undergoing as well as of doing, states of consciousness as well as      merely transitory processes. Here, then, Brentano for the first time      uncovered a structure which was to become one of the basic patterns for      all phenomenological analysis.” pp. 36-37

     (1) Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt I, Buch II, Kapitel I § 5 (pp.      125 f.; English translation p. 88).

101. ———. “On the Significance of the Correspondence between Franz      Brentano and Edmund Husserl.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 5 (1978):      95-116.
     “This correspondence, still unpublished, extends over fourty years.      Its significance is both biographical and philosophical. Biographically it      shows Brentano’s tolerant friendship for his emancipated student and      Husserl’s unwavering veneration for his only philosophical teacher. The      philosophical issues taken up are Euclidean axiomatics, Husserl’s      departure from Brentano in the Logical Investigations by distinguishing      two types of logic as the way out from psychologism, and the possibility      of negative presentations, but not Husserl’s new phenomenology. Few      agreements are reached, but the dissents were clarified.”
102. Spinicci Paolo. “Realtà E      Rappresentazione. Saggio Sulla Genesi Della Filosofia Dell’esperienza Nel      Pensiero Di Franz Brentano.” Rivista di Storia della      Filosofia (1985): 229-254.
103. Srzednicki Jan. “Remarks Concerning the Interpretation of the      Philosophy of Franz Brentano.” Philosophy and Phenomenological      Research 22 (1962): 308-316.
104. ———. “A Reply to Professor F. Mayer-Hillebrand.” Philosophy      and Phenomenological Research 23 (1963): 445-446.
105. ———. Franz Brentano’s Analysis of Truth. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff,      1965.
106. ———. “Some Elements of Brentano’s Analysis of Language and Their      Ramifications.” Revue Internationale de Philosophie 20 (1966):      434-445.
107. Tanasescu Ion. “Das Seiende Als Wahres Und Das Sein Der Kopula in      Der Dissertation Brentanos.” Brentano Studien.Internationales      Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung 10 (2003): 175-192.
108. Tassone Biagio G. From Psychology to Phenomenology: Franz Brentano’s      ‘Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint’ and Contemporary Philosophy of      Mind. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012.
109. Tegtmeier Erwin. “Individuation, Identity and Sameness. A      Comparison of Aristotle and Brentano.” Topoi Supplement 4 (1989):      117-126.
110. Terrell Dailey Burnham. “Brentano’s Argument for Reismus.”      Revue Internationale de Philosophie 20 (1966): 446-459.
     Reprinted with revisions, in: Linda McAlister – The philosophy of Brentano      – pp. 204-212
111. ———. “Franz Brentano’s Logical Innovations.” Midwest Studies      in Philosophy 1 (1976): 81-91.
112. ———. “Quantification and Brentano’s Logic.” Grazer      Philosophische Studien 5 (1978): 45-66.
     “Brentano’s innovations in logical theory are considered in the      context of his descriptive psychology, with its distinction between differences      in quality and in object of mental phenomena. Objections are raised to      interpretations that depend on a parallel between Urteil and assertion of      a proposition. A more appropriate parallel is drawn between the assertion      as subject to description in a metalanguage and the Urteil as secondary      object in inner perception. This parallel is then applied so as to suggest      a reinterpretation of substitutional quantification, rendering the      substitutional interpretation immune to problems that often arise as to      the relation between substitutional range and referential range.”
113. ———. “Brentano’s Philosophy of Mind.” In Contemporary      Philosophy. A New Survey – Vol. 4: Philosophy of Mind, edited by Fløistad,      Guttorm. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1983.
114. Textor Mark. “Brentano (and Some Neo-Brentanians) on Inner      Consciousness.” Dialectica (2006): 411-432.
     “Brentano’s theory of inner consciousness has recently had a      surprising comeback. However, it is still an open question how it is best      understood. It is widely held that according to Brentano a mental act is      conscious iff it is self-presenting. In contrast, I will argue that      Brentano holds that a mental act x is conscious iff it is unified with an      immediately evident cognition (‘Erkenntnis’) of x. If one understands      Brentano’s theory in this way, it promises to shed light on standard      problems for theories of inner consciousness.”
115. Thomasson Amie. “After Brentano: A One-Level Theory of      Consciousness.” European Journal of Philosophy 8 (2000): 190-209.
116. Tomasi Pietro. “The Unpublished “History of Philosophy”      (1866-1867) by Franz Brentano.” Axiomathes.An International Journal      in Ontology and Cognitive Systems 17 (2007): 99-108.
     “There are many difficulties with the existing interpretation of      Brentano’s works. The problem stems from the fact that Brentano’s works,      letters, manuscripts, memoirs, etc. remain unpublished or undiscovered.      Moreover some Brentano’s scholars, namely Kastil and Mayer-Hillebrandt,      were incorrect in their method in publishing the philosopher’s works.      Namely, they misinterpreted his earlier works by incorporating numerous      interpolations from different time periods as being the philosopher’s      final thoughts. More importantly, as evidenced by Antonio Russo’s recent      discovery (*), they also failed to realise the fact that Brentano’s own      theoretical views or works were mostly based on Aristotle and Thomas      thoughts on metaphysics, that Brentano’s main intention was to develop a      scientific demonstration on this topic, and that this issue occupied his      mind until his death.
     It is hoped that this paper goes some way in resolving the said errors and      coupled with the continue discovery of new material that the jigsaw of      Brentano’s works and thinking shall someday be correctly completed.”

     (*) [See: Russo Antonio (2003)]

117. ———. Una Nuova Lettura      Dell’aristotele Di Franz Brentano Alla Luce Di Alcuni Inediti. Trento: Uni Service, 2009.
118. Twardowski Kazimierz. “Franz Brentano and the History of      Philosophy.” In On Actions, Products and Other Topics in Philosophy,      edited by Brandl, Johannes and Wolenski, Jan. 243-253. Amsterdam: Rodopi,      1999.
     Translation by Arthur Szylewicz of a review of F. Brentano, Die vier      Phasen der Philosophie und ihr augenblicklicher Stand (1895) published in:      Przelom, 11 (II) August 3 1895, Vienna, pp. 335-346.
119. Valentine Elizabeth. “The Relation of Brentano to British      Philosophy.” Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz      Brentano Forschung 10 (2003): 263-268.
     “Brentano’s work has had, and has, its greatest influence in Austria,      Germany, Poland and Italy, but its importance for an understanding of      British analytical philosophy is increasingly being recognised.”
120. Vallicella William. “Brentano on Existence.” History of      Philosophy Quarterly 18 (2001): 311-327.
121. Vasyukov Vladimir L. “Antidiodorean Logics and the Brentano-Husserl’s      Conception of Time.” Axiomathes.An International Journal in Ontology      and Cognitive Systems 4 (1993): 373-388.
122. Velarde-Mayol Victor. On Brentano. Belmont: Wadsworth, 2002.
123. Vinogradov Evgeni G. “The Rationalistic Paradigm of Franz      Brentano and Kazimierz Twardowski.” In The Lvov-Warsaw School and      Contemporary Philosophy, edited by Kijania-Placek, Katarzyna and Wolenski,      Jan. 101-104. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1998.
124. Volpi Franco. Heidegger E      Brentano. L’aristotelismo E Il Problema Dell’univocità Dell’essere Nella      Formazione Filosofica Del Giovane Martin Heidegger. Padova:      Cedam, 1976.
125. ———. “The Experience of Temporal Objects and the Constitution of      Time-Consciousness by Brentano.” Topoi Supplement 4 (1989): 127-140.
126. ———. “War Franz Brentano Ein Aristoteliker? Zu Brentanos Und      Aristoteles’ Auffassung Der Psychologie Als Wissenschaft.” Brentano      Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung 2 (1989):      13-29.
127. ———. “La Doctrine      Aristotélicienne De L’être Chez Brentano Et Son Influence Sur Heidegger.”      In Aristote Au Xix Siècle, edited by Thouard, Denis. 277-293.      Villeneuve d’Asq Cédex: Presses Universitaires du Septentrion, 2004.
128. ———. “La Doctrine      Aristotélicienne De L’être Chez Brentano Et Son Influence Sur      Heidegger.” In Aristote Au Xix Siècle, edited      by Thouard, Denis. 277-293. Villeneuve d’Asq Cédex: Presses Universitaires      du Septentrion, 2004.
129. Weingartner Paul. “Brentano’s Criticism of the Correspondence      Theory of Truth and the Principle ‘Ens Et Verum Convertuntur’.”      Grazer Philosophische Studien 5 (1978): 183-196.
     “This paper investigates Brentano’s criticism of the correspondence      theory of truth within the context of a discussion of his ontological      assumptions. Brentano’s interpretation of the formula veritas est      adaequatio rei et intellectus and of the principle ens et verum      convertuntur is shown to fit into the history of these principles and into      modern interpretations like that of Tarski.”
130. Werle Josef. “Zur Edition Der Vorlseungen Franz Brentanos Über      Geschichte Der Philosophie.” Phänomenologische Forschungen 12 (1982):      178-187.
131. ———. Franz Brentano Und Die Zukunft Der Philosophie. Studien Zur      Wissenschaftsgeschichte Und Wissenschaftssystematik Im 19. Jahrhundert.      Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1989.
132. Werner Alfons. Die Psychologisch-Erkenntnistheoretischen Grundlagen      Der Metaphysik Franz Brentanos. Hildesheim: Borgmeyer, 1930.
133. Wolenski Jan. “Brentano’s Criticism of the Correspondence      Conception of Truth and Tarski’s Semantic Theory.” Topoi 8 (1989): 105-110.
     “This paper is a sequel to Simons and Wolenski [De Veritate:      Austro-Polish contributions to the theory of truth from Brentano to      Tarski, 1989], which contains a short discussion of Brentano’s arguments      against the theory of truth based on the concept of a correspondence      between truth-bearers and reality (or its appropriate portions). In that      paper we attempt to show that Tarski’s conception successfully meets      Brentano’s objections. l Here I should like to extend as well as, in some      points, improve what we said in Simons and Wolenski [1989]. There are      several reasons for doing this. First, the renaissance of Brentano’s own      philosophy and Brentanism in general requires that his arguments deserve      considerable attention. Secondly, Brentano’s arguments against the      correspondence theory of truth have become part of philosophical folklore.
     Thirdly, Tarski’s semantic truth-definition, despite the reservations      raised by several authors, is often considered as a possible modern      interpretation of the classical theory of truth. Fourth, Tarski’s theory      of truth is deeply rooted in the Brentanian theoretical tradition,      independent of Tarski’s own philosophical consciousness.
     It is further interesting to see how, if at all, his definition of truth      is affected by critical arguments of his philosophical great-grandfather      (via Twardowski, Lukasiewicz, Lesniewski and Kotarbinski).” (notes      omitted)
134. ———. “Brentano, the Univocality of Thinking, ‘Something’, and      ‘Reism’.” Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano      Forschung 5 (1994): 149-166.
     “Brentano’s argument for Reism from the univocality of ‘thinking’ is      examined. Firstly, Brentano’s original formulation is given. Secondly,      comments on the argument made by Marty, Kamitz, Teller and Farias are      summarized and briefly discussed. The univocality argument is then      embedded into the frameworks of two logical systems: predicate calculus      and Lesniewskian ontology; the latter system is shown as a more effective      basis for reism than the former. Finally, it is argued that a distinction      between formal-ontological reism and metaphysical reism should be      made.”
135. ———. “Reism in the Brentanist Tradition.” In The School of      Franz Brentano, edited by Albertazzi, Liliana, Libardi, Massimo and Poli,      Roberto. 357-375. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1996.
136. Wüstenburg Klaus. Die Konsequenz Des Phänomenalismus.      Erkenntnistheoretische Untersuchungen in Kritischer Auseinandersetzung Mit      Hume, Brentano Und Husserl. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2004.
137. Zahavi Dan. “Back to Brentano?”. Journal of Consciousness      Studies 11 (2004): 66-87.
     “For a couple of decades, higher-order theories of consciousness have      enjoyed great popularity, but they have recently been met with growing      dissatisfaction. Many have started to look elsewhere for viable      alternatives, and within the last few years, quite a few have rediscovered      Brentano. In this paper such a (neo-)Brentanian one-level account of      consciousness will be outlined and discussed. It will be argued that it      can contribute important insights to our understanding of the relation      between consciousness and self- awareness, but it will also be argued that      the account remains beset with some problems, and that it will ultimately      make more sense to take a closer look at Sartre, Husserl, and Heidegger,      if one is on the lookout for promising alternatives to the higher-order      theories, than to return all the way to Brentano.”
138. Zelaniec Wojciech. “Franz Brentano and the Principle of      Individuation.” Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz      Brentano Forschung 6 (1996): 145-164.
     “In this article I discuss a view on individuation exposed by      Brentano in his Theory of Categories. According to this view, it is the      spatial location of a physical thing that is its principle of      individuation. I put forward hypotheses concerning the assumptions on the      force of which Brentano might have arrived at this view. I also assess the      `price’ that has to be paid for making such assumptions.”
139. ———. “Disentanling Brentano: Why Did He Get Individuation      Wrong?”. Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano      Forschung 7 (1997): 455-463.
140. Zimmer Alf. “On Agents and Objects: Some Remarks on Brentanian      Perception.” In Consciousness, Knowledge and Truth, edited by Poli,      Roberto. 93-112. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1993.
141. Zingari Guido. “Brentano      Und Leibniz: Erkenntnistheoretische Grundlagen.” Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung      2 (1989): 31-42.